The opinion of the court was delivered by: Thomas W. Phillips United States District Judge
The plaintiff has filed his pro se complaint in this case alleging a claim of race discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). The defendants have moved for dismissal of plaintiff's suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Doc.
6]. The plaintiff has responded in opposition, and the defendants have replied. For the reasons stated below, defendants' dispositive motion [Docs. 6] is GRANTED.*fn1
As the law requires, all disputed facts and inferences are resolved most favorably for the plaintiff. The Court merely provides an abridged summary of facts for the purposes of this opinion.
Plaintiff Charles Edwards ("Edwards") was employed by ResourceMFG ("Staffing Solutions"), which is a temporary staffing company, in Knoxville, Tennessee. Edwards had informed Staff Solutions that he needed a second shift job so that he could take his wife, who has various aliments, to her doctor's appointments. Edwards was not given a second shift job, and, therefore, missed work on account of his wife's scheduled appointments, as well as on account of his own personal illnesses. In August of 2005, Edwards' employment was terminated. Edwards asserts that the decision to terminated his employment was related to his race. Edwards also claims that he was not informed that he had been fired until he "got another job threw (sic) there (sic) company," which, from the record, appears to have occurred in early September of 2005.
Defendant Ashley Krahl ("Krahl"), operations manager at Staffing Solutions, and defendant Ronda Ratliff ("Ratliff"), staffing supervisor at Staffing Solutions, dispute plaintiff's version of the facts. Defendants assert that they decided to terminate Edwards' employment on account of excessive absences in August of 2005. Both Ratliff and Krahl claim that they communicated their decision to Edwards on August 29, 2005 by telephone. Defendants assert that Edwards was removed from the employment rolls on August 28, 2005, which was his last day of employment.
On July 6, 2006, plaintiff filed an EECO charge alleging discrimination based upon race. Plaintiff asserted his claim against Staffing Solution and did not mention either defendant in his charge. Thereafter, plaintiff filed his suit in this District Court.
II. Law applicable to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment by defendants Krahl and Ratliff. While styling the motion as one for dismissal and/or summary judgment, in its memorandum in support of the motion, the defendants argue from the summary judgment point of view. The Court notes that Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b) requires the Court to treat the motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) as a motion for summary judgment if matters outside of the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the Court. The Court will therefore consider the motion as only one for summary judgment.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment will be granted by a court only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden is on the moving party to conclusively show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. A court must view the facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Morris v. Crete Carrier Corp., 105 F.3d 279, 280-81 (6th Cir.1997); 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987).
Once the moving party presents evidence sufficient to support a motion under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the nonmoving party is not entitled to a trial simply on the basis of allegations. The non-moving party is required to come forward with some significant probative evidence, which makes it necessary to resolve the factual dispute at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential ...