United States District Court, Eastern District of Tennessee
JAMES T. HIGDON, Plaintiff,
STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants
James T Higdon, Plaintiff, Pro se, Jacksboro, TN USA.
For State of Tennessee, District Attorney's Office For The Eighth District, William Paul Phillips, individually, William Paul Phillips, officially as Attorney General, Scarlett W Ellis, individually, Scarlett W Ellis, officially as Assistant DA, Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, Brent Harrison, individually, Brent Harrison, officially as TWRA Employee, State of Tennessee, Defendants: Joseph Paul Ahillen, LEAD ATTORNEY, Office of the Attorney General (Nashville), Nashville, TN USA.
For Harry Burden, individually, Harry Burden, officially as Foreperson of Grand Jury, Campbell County Tennessee, County of Campbell County, Tennessee, Verlin Hatfield, individually, Verlin Hatfield, officially as a Policeman in the City of LaFollette, Tennessee, Robbie Goins, officially as Sheriff of Campbell County, Tennessee, James Mccall, individually, James Mccall, officially as Employee in Campbell County, Tennessee, Cory Chapman, individually, Cory Chapman, officially as Employee in Campbell County, Tennessee, Cody Chapman, individually, Cody Chapman, officially as Employee in Campbell County, Tennessee, Franklin Ayers, individually, Franklin Ayers, officially as Employee in Campbell County, Tennessee, Billy Marlow, individually, Billy Marlow, officially as Employee, CCSD, in Campbell County, Tennessee, Defendants: Rhonda L Bradshaw, LEAD ATTORNEY, Spicer Rudstrom, PLLC (Knox), Knoxville, TN USA.
For Law Firm of Hall & Hatmaker, also known as, Hatmaker Law Office, Michael Glenn Hatmaker, individually, Michael Glenn Hatmaker, officially as Attorney, Defendants: J Thomas Jones, LEAD ATTORNEY, Jones, Meadows & Wall, PLLC, Knoxville, TN USA.
For Town of Jacksboro, Tennessee, Danny Chapman, officially as Chief of Police, Town of Jacksboro, Tennessee, Shannon Doah Marlow, individually, Shannon Doah Marlow, officially as a Fireman in the Town of Jacksboro, Tennessee, Shane Green, officially as Fire Chief in the Town of Jacksboro, Tennessee, James Skeans, individually, James Skeans, officially as Policeman in the Town of Jacksboro, Tennessee, City of Lafollette, Tennessee, Joel Grayson Clark, officially with LaFollette City Fire Department, City of Caryville, Tennessee, Bill Widenor, individually, Bill Widenor, officially as Chief of Police in the City of Caryville, Tennessee, Fred Stagnolia, individually, Fred Stagnolia, officially as Police Officer, Defendants: Reid A Spaulding, LEAD ATTORNEY, Watson, Roach, Batson, Rowell & Lauderback PLC, Knoxville, TN USA.
For Kamille Bond, individually, Kamille Bond, officially as Employee in Campbell County, Tennessee, Defendants: Russell W Adkins, LEAD ATTORNEY, Wilson Worley Moore Gamble & Stout, PC, Kingsport, TN USA.
Pamela L. Reeves, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
On August 12, 2014 the Court filed a memorandum opinion granting the numerous defendants' motions to dismiss and dismissing the pro se plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. [R. 136, 137]. The plaintiff has since filed three motions " to amend order" and one motion for a hearing. [R. 138, 144, 147, and 152]. The Court is required to liberally construe pro se pleadings in the plaintiff's favor. Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999). However, " this lenient treatment has limits . . . [and] courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted." Carolyn Lee Ali v. University of Michigan Health System-Risk Mgmt., 2012 WL 3110716, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
The plaintiff's motions do not specify the statutory basis for reconsideration, but the Court assumes it to be under Rule 59(e). In this Circuit, a court may reconsider or alter a judgment under Rule 59(e) to correct a clear legal error, based on newly discovered evidence, when there is an intervening change in the controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice. Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 551-52 (6th Cir. 2012). A motion under Rule 59 is not " intended as a vehicle to re-litigate previously considered issues; should not be utilized to submit evidence which could have been previously submitted in the exercise of reasonable diligence; and [is] not the proper vehicle to attempt to obtain a reversal of a judgment by offering the same arguments previously presented." See Kenneth Henes Special Projects Procurement v. Cont'l Biomass Indus. Inc., 86 F.Supp.2d 721, 726 (E.D.Mich. 2000). A showing of manifest injustice requires there be a fundamental flaw in the Court's decision that would lead to an inequitable result that is not in line with public policy absent correction. See United States v. Jarnigan, 2008 WL 5248172, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 2008) (citing McDaniel v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 2084277, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. July 17, 2007)).
The plaintiff has simply not set forth any justification that would entitle him to relief under Rule 59. Even liberally construing the plaintiff's motions in his favor, they appear to be nothing more than attempts to re-litigate his case that do not provide any information that would change the Court's original decision. Accordingly, the ...