United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JOHN S. BRYANT, Magistrate Judge.
Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment that the defendants, Houston County and Sharon Tomlinson (Ms. Tomlinson) have filed. (Docket Entry (DE) 31). Also pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment that the defendant, Ryan Pettit (Mr. Pettit) has filed. (DE 36). For the reasons set forth below, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment be GRANTED, that this action be DISMISSED with prejudice, that this be considered the final judgment, and that any appeal NOT be certified as taken in good faith under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). The Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Court DENY Houston County and Ms. Tomlinson's request that costs be assessed against the plaintiff. (DE 31, p. 1).
II. Procedural Background
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed his complaint on August 15, 2013. (DE 1). The defendants include Houston County; Ms. Tomlinson, the Circuit Court Clerk for Houston County; and Mr. Pettit, the plaintiff's probation officer. Houston County and Ms. Tomlinson have filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion (DE 32), a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (DE 33), the affidavit of the Houston County Sherriff (DE 34), and the affidavit of Ms. Tomlinson. (DE 35). The plaintiff has not responded and the defendants have filed a notice of this failure. (DE 42). Mr. Pettit has filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion (DE 37), a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (DE 38), the affidavit of the Tennessee Department of Corrections (TDOC) Director of Sentence Management Services (SMS), Candace Whisman (Ms. Whisman) (DE 39), and his own affidavit. (DE 40). The plaintiff has not responded to these, either.
On August 22, 2013, the District Judge referred this action to the Magistrate Judge. (DE 3). The Magistrate Judge warned the plaintiff that a failure to respond to a dispositive motion "may result in the Court taking the facts alleged in the matter as true and granting the relief requested." (DE 21, p. 4). Therefore, this matter is properly before the Court.
III. Factual Background
The District Judge construed the plaintiff's complaint as a claim for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 3). The plaintiff was formerly a TDOC inmate in the Houston County Jail. He alleges in his complaint that he was "detained on or about 117... days past the full expiration of [his] sentence." (DE 1, p. 2). He also alleges that he was on parole beyond the expiration of his sentence. (DE 1-1, p. 1). The plaintiff alleges that his wrongful imprisonment and parole were the result of the defendants' failure to properly complete and file court documents, including amended court orders. (DE 1, p. 2; DE 1-1, p. 1).
The timeline begins on July 08, 2010 when the plaintiff committed a felony, case 2011CR1. (DE 1-1, p. 8). From July 08, 2010 to October 06, 2010, the plaintiff was imprisoned and received pretrial jail credit. (DE 35-5). The plaintiff was released pending trial and committed separate offenses on November 06, 2010, which became a separate case, case 2011CR2. (DE 1-1, p. 8). The 91 days of pretrial jail credit from July 08, 2010 to October 06, 2010 only applied to case 2011CR1, not 2011CR2. (DE 39, p. 2). From December 27, 2010 to June 15, 2011, the plaintiff was imprisoned again and received pretrial jail credit. (DE 35-5).
The plaintiff's trial for both cases occurred on July 11, 2011, when the plaintiff was sentenced to 3 years of probation for the felony and for the separate offenses. (DE 32, p. 1; DE 35-5). On July 11, 2011, the plaintiff was released on probation (DE 35-2). However, he was charged with theft shortly thereafter and from September 22, 2011 to March 12, 2012, the plaintiff was imprisoned. (DE 40, p. 1; DE 35-5). He received jail credit for this time and remained in jail thereafter. (DE 35-5). At this point, the timeline becomes somewhat puzzling.
The plaintiff's probation was originally documented as revoked on July 09, 2012 and the original order was filed on August 13, 2012. (DE 1-1, p. 2). However, the plaintiff had been imprisoned before July 09, 2012 and the probation revocation was amended to March 12, 2012. (DE 1-1, p. 4). The amended order was not filed until January 14, 2013. (DE 1-1, p. 4).
A separate amended probation revocation document with jail and behavior credits was signed with a March 12, 2012 date. (DE 35-5, p. 1). However, this document was not filed until May 30, 2013. (DE 35-5). In the month preceding this, on April 17, 2013, the plaintiff inquired about the amended revocation order that had been filed on January 14, 2013 (DE 1-1, p. 5). SMS informed him in writing that this order was not in their records. (DE 1-1, p. 5). Later, on July 15, 2013, SMS responded to an inquiry from the plaintiff and informed him that he was "given all the time served credit listed on [his] revocation. [SMS] had to get an order from the Court... They were put on this past week." (DE 1-1, p. 7). On July 15, 2013, SMS also informed the plaintiff that his expiration date was November 01, 2013. (DE 1-1, p. 7). On July 30, 2013, the plaintiff was released to parole (DE 32, p. 2). The plaintiff was released from parole supervision on October 26, 2013. (DE 32, p. 2).
IV. Legal Standard
A. 42 U.S.C. ...