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Kutzback v. LMS Intellibound, LLC

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division

December 16, 2014

MICHAEL KUTZBACK, individually and on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v.
LMS INTELLIBOUND, LLC, a Foreign Limited Liability Company, and CAPSTONE LOGISTICS, LLC, a Domestic Limited Liability Company, Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONDITIONALLY CERTIFY COLLECTIVE ACTION AND FACILITATE NOTICE TO POTENTIAL CLASS MEMBERS ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO TOLL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

CHARMIANE G. CLAXTON, Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Kutzback's Motion to Conditionally Certify Collective Action and Facilitate Notice to Potential Class Members ("Plaintiff's Motion to Certify") (Docket Entry "D.E." #43) and Plaintiffs' Motion to Toll Statute of Limitations ("Plaintiff's Motion to Toll") (D.E. #64).The instant motions have been referred to United States Magistrate Judge. (D.E. #63, #67). For the reasons set forth herein, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion to Conditionally Certify Collective Action and Facilitate Notice to Potential Class members be GRANTED. Further, Plaintiff's Motion to Toll Statute of Limitations is DENIED without prejudice.

I. Introduction

This case arises from allegations that Defendants LMS Intellibound, LLC ("LMS") and Capstone Logistics, LLC ("Capstone"), [1] who are third-party warehouse servicers providing logistic services for companies in the warehouse, distribution, and manufacturing industries, violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §201, et seq., by failing to pay proper overtime and minimum wages. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 51-69). Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on October 2, 2013, which he later amended on January 3, 2014.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants operate approximately 239 locations nationwide. ( Id. ¶ 20). Plaintiff alleges that he was hired to work as a non-exempt "Unloader, " otherwise known as a "Lumper" (hereinafter "Unloader"), in or about June 2011. ( Id. ¶ 21). Plaintiff alleges that he worked as a non-exempt Unloader until August 2012, during which time he was compensated on a production basis as determined by the number and weight of the trucks unloaded. ( Id. ¶ 24). Plaintiff alleges that, during all times relevant to his claims, he worked in excess of forty hours within a workweek but was not properly compensated for all of his overtime hours. ( Id. ¶¶ 25-27). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' "Team Leads" and/or Managers "systematically and consistently clocked-out its Unloaders while still working, resulting in off-the-clock hours worked." ( Id. ¶ 28). Plaintiff alleges that the "pattern and practice of clocking-out Unloaders while still working is a nationwide practice." ( Id. ¶ 29). Plaintiff alleges that these practices resulted in a failure to pay both overtime and minimum wages in violation of the FLSA from June 2011 to present. ( Id. ¶¶ 31-34). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants have failed to maintain proper time records as mandated by the FLSA. ( Id. ¶ 34d).

As to the proposed collective action, Plaintiff alleges that he and the proposed opt-in plaintiffs are or were all non-exempt Unloaders employed Defendants and that they performed the same or similar job duties as one another. ( Id. ¶ 37). Plaintiff alleges that all of these non-exempt Unloaders were paid in the same manner, namely on a by-the-truck or piece-rate basis. ( Id. ¶ 38). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants uniformly require as their policy or practice all proposed opt-in plaintiffs to work off the clock in the aforementioned manner, thus failing to pay them their FLSA-mandated minimum wages and/or overtime wages. ( Id. ¶¶ 39-42). Thus, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint proposes that the proper collective action members should be defined as follows:

All production-only "Unloaders" (a/k/a "Lumpers") who worked for Defendants, nationwide, within the last three years, who worked in excess of 40 hours in one or more workweeks and were not compensated at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in one or more workweeks and were not compensated at a rate at least equivalent to the federal minimum wage in one or more workweeks as required by the FLSA.

As to the causes of action, Count I alleges that Defendants violated Sections 207 and 211 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 & 211, and 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.2 & 516.4 by failing to compensate Plaintiff and the proposed opt-in plaintiffs for the overtime hours worked and by failing to maintain proper time records. Count II alleges that Defendants violated Section 206 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206, by failing to compensate Plaintiff and the proposed opt-in plaintiffs he federally mandatedt minimum wage. Count III requests declaratory relief under the FLSA and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202.

On February 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Certify requesting the entry of an Order permitting, under Court supervision, notice to all Unloaders who were employed by Defendants within the last three years and were compensated on a production basis. Specifically, Plaintiff's Proposed Notice states as follows:

IF YOU ARE OR WERE, AT ANY TIME BETWEEN OCTOBER 02, 2010 TO THE PRESENT, AN UNLOADER (A/K/A "LUMPER") WHO WAS NOT PAID OVERTIME COMPENSATION IN WEEKS WHERE YOU WORKED MORE THAN FORTY HOURS WITHIN A WORK WEEK AND/OR NOT PAID MINIMUM WAGE FOR ALL HOURS WORKED, A COLLECTIVE ACTION LAWSUIT MAY AFFECT YOUR RIGHTS.

(Pl.'s Mot. to Certify, Exh. 1). At the time of the filing of the Motion to Certify, seven opt-in plaintiffs had joined the suit, including six who provided declarations in support thereof. (Mot. to Certify, Collective Exh. E & D.E. #5, #6, #7, #8, #9, #10, #33). Since the filing of the Motion to Certify, another opt-in plaintiff has joined the suit. (D.E. #61).

On April 2, 2014, Defendants responded that Plaintiff's Motion to Certify should be denied on at least four independent grounds: (1) Plaintiff has not established that he and the proposed opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated because he has not presented any evidence that they were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the FLSA; (2) Plaintiff has not established that he and the proposed opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated because the evidence demonstrates vastly differing employment conditions of the more than 25, 000 proposed opt-in plaintiffs who worked at hundreds of work sites for over 1, 000 different managers with different timekeeping and compensation requirements; (3) Plaintiff has failed to established that a collective action of his claims would be manageable; and, (4) Plaintiff has only brought forth the allegations of a "microscopic fraction of a proposed collective active, " and Defendants have brought forth contrary evidence that directly refutes his allegations.

On October 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Toll asserting that the statute of limitations should be tolled for potential opt-in plaintiffs as of February 18, 2014, the date of the filing of the Motion to Certify. On October 24, 2014, Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Toll arguing that the "extraordinary" relief requested by Plaintiff is not consistent with the statutory scheme set forth under the FLSA. Defendants further assert that tolling is inappropriate because nothing has prevented or is preventing any potentially aggrieved individuals from pursuing their claims by filing their own suits or opting-in to this action.

II. Proposed Analysis

A. Motion to Certify

The FLSA provides, in pertinent part, the following on pursuing collective actions:

An action to recover the liability [for unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation]... may be maintained against any employer... in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.

29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The two key requirements of Section 216(b) are that the plaintiffs must be similarly situated and that all plaintiffs must signal in writing their affirmative consent to participate in the action. Comer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 454 F.3d 544, 546 (6th Cir. 2006) ...


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