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Wilson v. State

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division

January 2, 2015



JAMES D. TODD, District Judge.

On August 19, 2014, Plaintiff Curterrio Wilson, booking number 13129008, a pretrial detainee at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Complex in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accompanied by a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis . (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) In an order issued on August 21, 2014, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants[1] as the State of Tennessee; Shelby County District Attorney General Amy P. Weirich; Assistant District Attorney Generals D. Ayers and C.L. Price; Mary Thomas, the foreperson of the grand jury; and Shelby County Criminal Court Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett.[2]

The factual allegations of the complaint are as follows:

On January 7, 2014 a True Bill indictment was returned against the Plaintiff from the Grand Jury foreperson Mary Thomas and assigned to D. Ayers/C.L. Price for Prosecution from 30th Judicial Attorney General Amy P. Weirich in Criminal Court Division 4 under the supervision of Judge Blackett whom all acted outside the scope of their authority by committing fraud under an endorsed oath of office while in public office to uphold all laws of the State of Tennessee and the U.S. Constitution. Grand Jury foreperson Mary Thomas signature on a True Bill indictment was forged under misrepresentation of the State of Tennessee government ethics and accountability due to the Grand Jury foreperson being deceased and unable to certify a true bill claim. A Ponzi scheme and conspiracy to defraud the government and myself for personal gain of a public office was developed by the participation to prosecute an unlawful act against me by Amy P. Weirich (District Attorney General) and Criminal Court Division 4 Prosecutor D. Ayers/C.L. Price all under Anti-Trust laws of the commerce law due to knowingly, willingly, and intentionally conspiring in secrecy to defraud the government through embezzlement and bribery for personal gain using fraudulent tactics to prosecute me[.]

(ECF No. 1 at PageID 2-3.) Plaintiff seeks his immediate release and money damages from each Defendant in the amount of $20 million. ( Id. at PageID 4.)

By way of background, on January 7, 2014, the grand jury returned two indictments against Wilson. Indictment Number 14 00003 charged Wilson with two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm with intent to commit a felony. Indictment Number 14 00004 charged Wilson with one count of aggravated robbery. Those charges are pending.[3]

The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaint-

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be granted, the standards under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). "Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'" Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). "[P]leadings that... are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 ("Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a showing, ' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also grounds' on which the claim rests.").

"A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally." Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). "Any complaint that is legally frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Id. (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328-29).

Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as ...

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