United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Greeneville
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. RONNIE GREER, District Judge.
Nigel Marlin Reid, Sr., brings this pro se civil rights complaint for injunctive and monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against five defendants, each of whom has allegedly violated his right to "Freedom of Expression, " as secured to him by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, [Doc. 2]. Plaintiff has also submitted numerous attachments to his pleading, [Docs. 2-1 through 2-13]. Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, [Doc. 1].
I. Screening the Complaint
Cases filed in forma pauperis must be screened under 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2) to determine whether they state a claim entitling a plaintiff to relief or whether they are frivolous or malicious or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 609 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that § 1915(e)(2) applies to complaints filed in forma pauperis by prisoners and non-prisoners alike), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). A complaint will not pass the screening test unless it presents "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, " so as to clothe a claim in "facial plausibility." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The "facial plausibility" standard does not require "detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
If the complaint does not state a claim or is frivolous, malicious, or seeks damages from an immune defendant, this suit must be dismissed. In performing its screening task, the Court bears in mind that the pleadings of pro se litigants must be liberally construed and "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The Court examines the complaint in light of these requirements.
This case is one of several federal lawsuits involving disputes between plaintiff and owners or managers of commercial, charitable, or recreational property, who have suspended him or taken other action to prohibit him from going on their properties. See e.g., Reid v. West, Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-334 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) (Memorandum and Order, Jan. 21, 2015); Reid v. Williams, Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-275 (E.D. Tenn. 2013) (Memorandum and Order, Nov. 21, 2013); Reid v. Osborne, Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-283 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (Memorandum and Order Aug. 21, 2012). Though the complaint is confusing, the Court has endeavored to piece together plaintiff's claims from the allegations in the pleading and the contents of documents submitted as attachments to the complaint.
1. Factual Allegations
In the pleading, plaintiff maintains that, on February 4, 2014, Defendant Letitia Singleton sent a statement to Defendant Craig Price that she did not want plaintiff to be in her Zumba class at the Parks and Recreation Center. According to an attachment to the complaint, Price is the Director of the Morristown, Tennessee, Parks and Recreation Department, [Doc. 2, Attachment 2-8]. In her statement, Singleton writes that plaintiff came into the Zumba class she was teaching, stood obscured from her view, but visible to her students, and that, afterwards, her students complained that plaintiff "creeped them out" and asked if he could be requested not to "come into the class and just watch the ladies like he did, " [Doc. 2, Attachment 2-6].
Plaintiff alleges that, on February 6, 2014, Price refused to allow him to participate in the Zumba class and asked another employee to write a restraining letter, listing the facilities managed by Parks and Recreation from which plaintiff had been banned, [Doc. 2, Attachment 2-7]. Plaintiff also maintains that on that same date, he went the Parks and Recreation office to talk to Price, who was out of the office, so he spoke instead with Defendant Jennifer Gentry. Gentry informed plaintiff that Price had prohibited plaintiff from joining the Zumba class. Plaintiff responded that he "was tired of white people treating him like a N_____ [ethnic slur], PERIOD" and that he meant it.
Price instructed Gentry to call the Morristown Police Department, and plaintiff cites to a police report as stating that plaintiff had been threatening and harassing Gentry and other Parks and Recreation staff members, [Doc. 2, Attachment 2-3]. Later, however, Gentry clarified that plaintiff had not actually threatened her on that date, but that she had perceived the conversation as being threatening towards her, [Doc. 2, Attachment 2-5]. A letter from an officer with the Morristown Police Department, dated February 7, 2014, lists five locations from which, at the request of the management of Parks and Recreation, plaintiff was not allowed to frequent and warns him that he will be prosecuted if he is found on the listed properties after that date, [Doc. 2, Attachment 2-2 and 2-4 (2-4 is a duplicate copy of 2-2)].
Plaintiff attended a city council meeting to complain about being banned from Parks and Recreation properties, but the problem was not resolved. Plaintiff also contacted the NAACP and his city councilman for help with his suspension from the Parks and Recreation facilities. The NAACP representative and plaintiff's city councilman met with Price in June and, thereafter, Price wrote plaintiff a letter indicating that plaintiff's full privileges to all Parks and Recreation facilities would be restored on March 8, 2014, with a six-month probationary period, [Attachment 2-8 and 2-9 (2-9 is a duplicate copy of 2-8)]. In another letter, Price also indicates that plaintiff's suspension from certain Parks and Recreation facilities would be lifted on February 8, 2014, though his return to those properties was conditioned on a years' probation, with the warning that any future violations of the rules could lead to his permanent suspension, [Attachment 2-11].
Obviously dissatisfied with these results, plaintiff called the NAACP representative, who met with the Parks and Recreation Board Chairman who, in turn, invited plaintiff to meet with the Parks and Recreation Board. As the Court understands the plaintiff's allegations, he now is free to go to Morristown parks, which are operated by Parks and Recreation, but he must serve a one year's probationary period, rather than the six-months he initially was set to serve. According to plaintiff, it is a mystery to him as to how his original 13-month suspension, with six months of probation, coalesced into a 12-month suspension, with one years' probation.
Plaintiff maintains that he can prove that he did not break any rules of the Parks and Recreation Department, [Attachment 2-10], and that he has been subjected to violations of his First Amendment rights and to "color/age/national origin sex" discrimination, [Doc. 2 at 2]. For these alleged violations of his civil rights, plaintiff ...