February 3, 2015
DIANA L. POWELL, ET AL.
PENNY D. CLARK
December 2, 2014
from the Circuit Court for Rutherford County. No. 62933.
Robert E. Corlew, III, Judge, sitting by interchange.
Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed and Remanded.
Sowell, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Allstate
D. Galligan and Susan N. Marttala, McMinnville, Tennessee,
for the appellees, Diana and Ronald Powell.
ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J.,
appeal involves a limitation of liability in an insurance
policy. Appellant Allstate Insurance Company seeks reduction
of its uninsured motorist liability by amounts paid by
Appellee insured's automobile insurance carrier. In light
of the legislative intent that offsets should be limited to
monies received from legally responsible parties or entities,
and the limiting language used in the Allstate policy, we
conclude that the trial court correctly denied the offset in
this case. Affirmed and remanded.
relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. On July 1,
2012, Diana Powell was riding as a guest passenger in a
vehicle driven by Patricia Collins. Ms. Collins' vehicle
was struck by a vehicle that was driven by Penny Clark. There
is no dispute that Ms. Clark was 100% at fault for the
collision. However, Ms. Clark never appeared in the case and
was an uninsured motorist at the time of the accident.
Powell was insured by State Farm. Her policy included
uninsured motorist limits of $100,000.00. Her policy also
provided medical payments coverage in the amount of
$100,000.00. Patricia Collins was insured by Allstate
Insurance Company (" Allstate," or "
Appellant" ). Her policy likewise provided an uninsured
motorist coverage limit of $100,000.00. However, Ms.
Collins' policy only provided for medical payments
coverage in the amount of $2,000.00.
is no dispute that Allstate, rather than State Farm, is the
primary carrier for uninsured motorist coverage with respect
to this accident. See Tenn. Code Ann. §
Allstate paid Ms. Powell $2,000.00 under the medical portion
of Ms. Collins' policy. Thereafter, State Farm, under its
policy, paid medical payments in the amount of $70,021.32 on
behalf of Ms. Powell.
Powell and her husband Ronald (together the "
Powells," or " Appellees" ) filed suit against
Penny Clark on June 27, 2011. A summons was issued for State
Farm as the uninsured motorist carrier for the Powells. A
summons was also issued for Allstate as the uninsured
motorist carrier for Ms. Collins. State Farm filed its answer
on July 28, 2011. Allstate filed its answer on August 1,
2011. As noted above, the named defendant, Ms. Clark, never
made an appearance. On September 2, 2011, an agreed order of
dismissal was entered as to State Farm.
October 30, 2012, the Powells filed a motion for declaratory
judgment, asking the trial court to determine that Allstate
was not entitled to offset the medical payments made by State
Farm against Allstate's uninsured motorist limits. On
December 3, 2012, the trial court issued a memorandum
opinion, in which it specifically held that " Allstate
Insurance is not allowed to setoff payments made by State
Farm Mutual Insurance to or on behalf of the Plaintiff for
medical expenses for treatment of injuries the Plaintiff
received in the accident at issue." In so holding, the
trial court reasoned, in relevant part, as follows:
[T]he clear language of the Allstate policy. . . provides
that Allstate is entitled to a setoff for the $67,500 paid by
State Farm. The practical application of such a decision,
however, is far-reaching. First, because State Farm has the
right of subrogation under the terms of its policy, Allstate
would effectively be able to preclude any such recovery by
State Farm. Thus, by stepping up promptly to provide relief
for its insured, State Farm would be in the position of
saving money for Allstate while expend[ing] its own dollars
which otherwise would have been paid first by Allstate to the
injured party, and then potentially recouped by State Farm.
Were this rule to be enforced, the obvious result would be
the position of insurers that they will not pay until all
other sources of payment have been made.
trial court further reasoned that:
The Allstate policy appears to show that the maximum payment
the Plaintiff could receive under that policy is $100,000,
including all payments from other sources. Though the State
Farm policy is not exhibited, State Farm's pleadings
before they were dismissed from the action show that State
Farm was wanting to be credited for the medical payments it
made against the $100,000, including medical payments.
Because the law provides that the Allstate policy provides
primary coverage, then State Farm should not be required to
make payments until the Allstate policy is exhausted. Were we
to allow Allstate an offset then Allstate would pay some
$32,500 and State Farm would pay some $67,500.
[I]nsurance companies cannot be required to pay for losses in
excess of the limits to which they have agreed. . . . The
proof before us shows that the
terms of each policy provide that an injured Plaintiff is
entitled to a maximum of $100,000 including all payments.
Thus, Allstate, which provides the primary coverage, should
be required to pay its limits if the evidence justifies an
award of $100,000 or more, and then State Farm is entitled to
subrogation as to the payments which it advanced. Because the
law provides that the Allstate policy of insurance is
primary, we find that Allstate should be required to pay the
entire limits of their policy to the extent that the evidence
justifies such payments. . . . [W]ere we to find that
Allstate is entitled to the setoff it claims, State Farm
would pay at least twice the sum that Allstate pays ($67,500
versus $32,500), and the net effect of such a ruling would be
that the State Farm policy was actually primary, at least to
the extent of the costs of medical care. Such a decision
would be in derogation of the provisions of Tennessee law.
March 14, 2013, the trial court entered an order on the
motion for declaratory judgment, in which it reiterated its
findings and concluded that Allstate was not entitled to
offset the State Farm payment.
March 25, 2013, Allstate filed a motion for interlocutory
appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.
Although the trial court granted the motion for interlocutory
appeal, this Court denied hearing the Rule 9 appeal by order
of June 12, 2013. A final hearing on the issue of damages was
held by the trial court on April 17, 2014. By order of May
22, 2014, the trial court held:
[T]he Court found that Plaintiffs are entitled to the sum of
$200,000.00 for injuries sustained in the automobile accident
from which this case arose. It is undisputed that Allstate
Insurance Company, the primary uninsured motorist carrier in
this case, has previously paid the sum of $2,000.00 to
Plaintiffs under the Medpay provisions of the uninsured
motorist coverage applicable to this case. It is further
undisputed that Allstate's uninsured motorist limits of
liability are $100,000.00.
IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs are
awarded damages against the Defendant, Penny D. Clark, in the
amount of $200,000.00 for injuries sustained in the
automobile accident out of which this case arose.
IT IS FURTHER, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Plaintiffs shall take judgment against Allstate Insurance
Company in the amount of the uninsured motorist limits of
$100,000.00, less $2,000.00 for the amount previously paid to
Plaintiffs under the Medpay provisions of the policy. The
Plaintiffs shall have judgment against Allstate Insurance
Company, therefore, in the amount of $98,000.00.
appeals. The sole issue for review is whether Allstate is
entitled to reduce its uninsured motorist limits by amounts
paid by the Appellee's automobile insurance carrier.
Standard of Review
issue in this appeal requires us to interpret both the
language of the Allstate insurance policy, and the relevant
Tennessee uninsured motorist statutes. Accordingly, our
analysis is guided by several well-established principles.
First, Tennessee law is clear that questions regarding the
extent of insurance coverage present issues of law involving
the interpretation of contractual language. Clark v.
Sputniks, LLC, 368 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tenn. 2012);
Maggart v. Almany Realtors,
Inc., 259 S.W.3d 700, 703 (Tenn. 2008). Likewise,
questions regarding the interpretation of a statute involve
issues of law. In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d
483, 490 (Tenn. 2012). Therefore, our standard of review is
de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded
to the conclusions reached by the trial court. U.S. Bank,
N.A. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 277 S.W.3d 381, 386
Applicable Statutory Language
turning to the applicable sections of Tennessee's
uninsured motorist law, we first note that
[ uninsured/underinsured motorist] statutes, as a matter of
law, become provisions of all automobile insurance policies
issued for delivery in Tennessee. Where there is a conflict
between a statutory provision and a policy provision, the
statutory provision must prevail.
Sherer et al. v. Linginfelter et al., 29 S.W.3d 451,
454 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Fleming v. Yi, 982 S.W.2d
868, 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)).
interpreting a statute, courts " must ascertain and give
effect to the legislative intent without restricting or
expanding the statute's intended meaning." U.S.
Bank, 277 S.W.3d at 386. Our task is to examine the text
of the statute and, if the language used is unambiguous, we
simply apply the plain meaning of the words used in the
statute. Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., 347 S.W.3d
686, 694 (Tenn. 2011); U.S. Bank, 277 S.W.3d at 386.
As the Tennessee Supreme Court recently observed, courts
" must (1) give these words their natural and ordinary
meaning, (2) consider them in the context of the entire
statute, and (3) presume that the General Assembly intended
to give each of these words its full effect." In re
Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d at 490. Every word in a
statute is presumed to have meaning and purpose.
Nye, 347 S.W.3d at 694; Highwoods Props., Inc.
v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695, 701 (Tenn. 2009).
If, after examining the text of the statute, it becomes clear
the statute is ambiguous, " we may reference the broader
statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other
sources to discern its meaning." Highwoods
Props., 297 S.W.3d at 701; see also Mills
v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012) (
" When necessary to resolve a statutory ambiguity or
conflict, courts may consider matters beyond the statutory
text, including public policy, historical facts relevant to
the enactment of the statute, the background and purpose of
the statute, and the entire statutory scheme." ). "
However, these non-codified external sources cannot provide a
basis for departing from clear codified statutory
provisions." Mills, 360 S.W.3d at 368 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
limits of liability for an insurer under its uninsured
motorist coverage, Tennessee Code Annotated Section
(d) The limit of liability for an insurer providing uninsured
motorist coverage under this section is the amount of that
coverage as specified in the policy less the sum of the
limits collectible under all liability and/or primary
uninsured motorist policies. . .applicable to the bodily
injury or death of the insured.
insurer providing the uninsured motorist coverage is also
entitled to subrogation as provided under Tennessee Code
Annotated Section 56-7-1204:
(a) In the event of payment to any person under the coverage
required by this part, and subject to the terms and
conditions of the coverage, the insurer making payment shall,
to the extent of the coverage, be subrogated to all of the
rights of the person to whom payment has been made, and shall
be entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment
resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery of the
person against any person or organization legally responsible
for the bodily injury or property damage for which payment is
made. . .
( Emphasis added). Importantly, the subrogation provisions,
when read in pari materia with the other uninsured
motorist statutes, " allow the insurer to recover from
its insured only those amounts received from persons or
entity causing those same damages." Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 56-7-1204, cmt. 1; Sherer, 29 S.W.3d at 454.
Code Annotated Section 56-7-1205 provides, in pertinent part,
Nothing contained in this part shall be construed as
requiring the forms of coverage provided pursuant to this
part, whether alone or in combination with similar coverage
afforded under other liability policies, to afford limits in
excess of those that would be afforded had the insured under
the policies been involved in an accident with a motorist who
was insured under a policy of liability insurance with the
minimum limits described in § 55-12-107, or the
uninsured motorist liability limits of the insured's
policy if the limits are higher than the limits described in
in § 55-12-107. The forms of coverage may include terms,
exclusions, limitations, conditions, and offsets that are
designed to avoid duplication of insurance and other
Tennessee courts have interpreted the statutory language,
" [t]he forms of coverage may include terms, exclusions,
limitations, conditions, and offsets . . .," to provide
" limited coverage." In Terry v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 510 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn. 1974), our
Supreme Court explained that limited coverage theory "
is based on a finding [that] the legislative purpose. . .is
to provide insured a recovery only up to the statutory
minimum required without regard to insured's actual
damages, unless such be less than the statutory
minimum." Id. at 513. As noted by this Court,
" [t]he uninsured motorist insurance carrier is entitled
to a credit to offset its liability by any recovery received
by the insured from whatever source that would result in
duplication of the amount to be collected under the uninsured
motorist coverage." Clark v. Shoaf, 302 S.W.3d
849, 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). Accordingly, the usual
uninsured motorist endorsements provide for reduction of the
uninsured motorist limits for (a) payments made under the
liability or medical payment feature of the policy; (b)
amounts paid under any workers' compensation law,
disability benefits law, or similar law; and (c) all sums
paid by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be
legally responsible. See generally Phillip A.
Fleissner & Paul Campbell III, Tennessee Automobile
Liability Insurance § 18.2 (2007-08 ed.); see,
e.g., Green v. Johnson, 249 S.W.3d 313 (Tenn.
2008) (holding that insurer was allowed to offset any amounts
insured received from settlement with non-motorist
tortfeasors against the amounts owed under underinsured
motorist policy); Poper ex rel. Poper v. Rollins, 90
S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2002) (holding that insurer was entitled to
offset amounts collected by insured in settlement with other
defendants); Giannini v. Proffitt, No.
W2011-00342-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 1478785 (Tenn. Ct. App. April
27, 2012) (holding that the limitation of liability language
in uninsured motorist policy, reducing insurer's
liability by sums paid under laws similar to workers'
compensation laws, applied to
preclude recovery); Sherlin v. Hall, 237 S.W.3d 647
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the limits of liability
of the uninsured motorist coverage policy were reduced and,
in fact, negated by the amount of the workers'
compensation benefits paid to insured).
Relevant Contract Language
well-established in Tennessee is the principle that "
[i]nsurance policies are, at their core, contracts."
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tarrant, 363 S.W.3d 508, 527
(Tenn. 2012) (Koch, J., dissenting). As such, courts
interpret insurance policies using the same tenets that guide
the construction of any other contract. Am. Justice Ins.
Reciprocal v. Hutchison, 15 S.W.3d 811, 814 (Tenn.
2000). Thus, the terms of an insurance policy "
'should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, for
the primary rule of contract interpretation is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the parties.'"
Clark, 368 S.W.3d at 441 (quoting U.S.
Bank, 277 S.W.3d at 386-87). The policy should be
construed " as a whole in a reasonable and logical
manner," Standard Fire Ins. Co. v.
Chester--O'Donley & Assocs., 972 S.W.2d 1,
7(Tenn. Ct. App.1998), and the language in dispute should be
examined in the context of the entire agreement. Cocke
City Bd. of Highway Comm'rs v. Newport Utils. Bd.,
690 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Tenn.1985).
addition, contracts of insurance are strictly construed in
favor of the insured, and if the disputed provision is
susceptible to more than one plausible meaning, the meaning
favorable to the insured controls. Tata v. Nichols,
848 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tenn.1993); VanBebber v. Roach,
252 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). However, a "
strained construction may not be placed on the language used
to find ambiguity where none exists."
Farmers--Peoples Bank v. Clemmer, 519 S.W.2d 801,
of the Allstate policy is titled " Uninsured Motorist
Insurance Coverage." This part contains the following,
relevant language under the " Exclusions--What is not
Limits of Liability
* * *
Limits payable will be reduced by all amounts paid or payable
by the owner or operator of the uninsured auto or anyone else
responsible. This includes all sums collected or collectible
under the bodily injury liability coverage of this or any
other policy and all sums collected or collectible under the
uninsured motorist coverage of this or any other policy.
* * *
2. Damages payable will be reduced by:
a) all amounts paid by or on behalf of the owner or operator
of the uninsured auto, including an uninsured auto or anyone
else responsible. This includes all sums paid under the
bodily injury liability coverage or property damage liability
coverage of this or any other auto policy.
b) all amounts paid or payable under any workers compensation
law, disability benefits law, or similar law, Automobile
Medical Payments, or any similar medical payments coverage
under this or any other auto policy. . . .
contends that the language " Automobile Medical
Payments, or any similar medical payments coverage under this
or any other auto policy. . ." allows it to offset the
$70,021.32 in medical payments that were paid on Ms.
Powell's behalf under her own State Farm policy. In this
regard, the instant case is similar to Elsner v.
Walker, 879 S.W.2d 852 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1994), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 13, 1994).
In Elsner, the uninsured motorist policy provided
that " the limit of liability shall be reduced by all
sums paid because of bodily injury or property damage by or
on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally
responsible." Id. at 853. As in this case, in
Elsner, the insurer sought a setoff for medical
insurance coverage provided to the plaintiffs by their own
medical insurance carrier. Id. This Court
interpreted the language, " persons or organizations who
may be legally responsible," to mean " that the
insurer intends to reduce its liability by the amount
received from others who are responsible for the damage or
injury." Id. at 854 (emphasis added). The
Elsner Court noted that the insurance contract at
issue in that case did not contain " an explicit, plain
statement that the [insurer's] liability would be reduced
by sums paid by an insured's medical insurance
carrier." Id. The Court further noted that if
the insurer had intended that it be entitled to a reduction
for payments of an insured's medical insurance, it could
have included such a provision. Id.
noted by this Court in Elsner, courts interpreting
offset language have " found that liability may be
reduced by all sums paid because of bodily injury or property
damage by or on behalf of persons or organizations legally
responsible for injury or damage." Id. at 854
(emphasis added) (citing Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co.,
115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227, 1233-34 (Idaho 1988) (rejecting
insurer's argument that it could reduce its liability by
the value of a college scholarship granted to insured as a
result of injuries insured sustained in automobile accident);
Aills v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 88 N.C.App.
595, 363 S.E.2d 880 (N.C. 1988) (dismissing insurer's
argument that the plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage
should be reduced by medical payments made under another
provision of the automobile policy and disability payments
made through a separate disability policy).
the insurer in Elsner ostensibly sought to nullify
the qualifying term " by or on behalf of persons or
organizations who may be legally responsible," in
Edmondson v. Solomon, No. 01A01-9802-CV-00097, 1999
WL 11512 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), the insurer sought to have
this Court nullify the term " law," i.e., " we
will not pay for any element of loss if a person is entitled
to receive payment for the same element of loss under any of
the following or similar law." Id. at *1. In
Edmondson, we held that the offset was not allowed
for payments under employer's and personal disability
policies because these payments were not made under any
disability benefits law. Id. at *3; but see
Giannini v. Proffitt, No. W2011-00342-COA-R3-CV,
2012 WL 1478785 (holding that sums paid under laws similar to
workers' compensation laws, applied to limit
insurer's uninsured motorist liability). In discussing
the validity of various offset provisions in uninsured
motorist coverage policies, Tennessee Automobile Liability
Insurance § 18.2 cites the Edmondson case for
the proposition that:
While there is logical basis for offsetting payments by
parties at fault, certain types of payments made by the
insured's own automobile insurance carrier, and statutory
workers' compensation or similar benefits, surely it is
doubtful that the Commissioner of Insurance would allow
filings diminishing [uninsured motorist] coverage by payments
secured under an insured's individual or group health
insurance or disability insurance plan.
Id. at n. 6. We concede that Tennessee's
adoption of " limited coverage" has led to the
primary objective of liberally allowing offsets so long as
those offsets do not " result in duplication of the
amount to be
collected under the uninsured motorist coverage."
Clark, 302 S.W.3d 849; Boyce v. Geary, No.
01-A-01-9409-CV-00410, 1995 WL 245389 (Tenn. Ct. App. April
28, 1995). However, there is also a more subtle concept of
legal liability at play in the statutes and caselaw. This
idea of liability is not specifically fault-based; rather, it
rests upon the equitable notion that various offsets,
although broadly construed to give effect to the limited
coverage scheme our Legislature has adopted, should
nonetheless be allowed only if such payments are made by the
party at fault for the accident, or the person or entity
legally responsible. Sherer, 29 S.W.3d at 454
(holding that the uninsured motorist coverage statutes allow
the insurer to recover from its insured only those amounts
received from the person or entity causing those same
concede that the language employed in the Allstate policy is
more specific than the language at issue in the
Elsner policy in that the language here clearly
contemplates offset for medical payments, i.e., "
[d]amages payable will be reduced by. . . any similar medical
payments coverage under this or any other auto policy."
As noted above, insurance policies should be construed "
as a whole in a reasonable and logical manner,"
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Chester--O'Donley &
Assocs., 972 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App.1998), and the
language in dispute should be examined in the context of the
entire agreement. Cocke City Bd. of Highway
Comm'rs, 690 S.W.2d at 237. In addition, as a matter
of law, all provisions of the Tennessee Uninsured Motorist
statute are made part of all insurance policies issued for
delivery in Tennessee. See Dunn v. Hackett,
833 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). This means that we must
interpret the policy language in light of the legislative
intent as set out in the applicable portions of the uninsured
motorist law. We have previously discussed the holding that
the uninsured motorist coverage statutes allow the insurer to
recover from its insured only those amounts received from the
person or entity causing those same damages. This intent is
acknowledged in the Allstate policy at issue here. The
uninsured motorist coverage section of the policy, states
that the " [l]imits payable will be reduced by all
amounts paid or payable by the owner or operator of the
uninsured auto or anyone else responsible" (emphasis
added). While the specific reduction of damages language in
the policy broadly states that damages payable will be
reduced by " any similar medical payments coverage under
this or any other policy," under well-settled contract
interpretation principles, we must read this language in
pari materia with the entire agreement. Accordingly, we
read the broad exception for medical payments in light of the
language set out in the same section of the policy that
policy limits will be reduced by payments paid or payable by
" anyone else responsible."
there is no dispute that State Farm is not the legally
responsible insurer. As discussed above, by statute, Allstate
is the legally responsible uninsured motorist carrier in this
case. Nonetheless, Allstate seeks to reduce its legal
obligation to pay under the uninsured motorist section of the
policy by monies paid by State Farm to its insured for
medical coverage. To allow such offset would not only
contradict the contractual language that policy limits will
be reduced by payments made by " anyone else
responsible," but such interpretation would also violate
the legislative intent to limit offsets to those monies paid
or payable by the legally responsible parties.
addition to not being the legally responsible entity in this
case, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(b)(3)(A), State
Farm may also have a right of subrogation
against Allstate for the $70,021.32 it paid to the Powells.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1204. The trial court's
memorandum opinion indicates that State Farm pursued its
subrogation right in this case. Regardless, in Bayless v.
Pieper et al., No. M2008-01073-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL
2632763 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2009), we held that an
insurer was not entitled to reduce its obligation under an
uninsured motorist policy by setting off the portion of the
liability benefits payment that were used to pay the
workers' compensation subrogation interest. Id.
at *1. The Bayless Court reasoned that " [a]
holding to the contrary would cause the insured to suffer a
double reduction in benefits resulting from a single
settlement payment made by the tortfeasor's liability
insurer." Id. at *3 (citing Boyce,
1995 WL 245389 at *3). Furthermore, such holding would "
ignore language included in the statute to protect the rights
of insureds against the otherwise unrestricted power of
insurance companies to impose on them limitations and offsets
which could effectively eliminate the benefits to which their
premium payment entitles them." Id. In so
holding, the court noted that the " duplication"
language in the statute is to " prevent the insured from
receiving a windfall in benefits, not to empower insurers to
receive a windfall in offsets or eliminate benefits they are
obligated to pay." Id. at *4. The
interpretation proposed by Allstate in this case would
frustrate the legislative purpose and would ignore the
contractual language allowing reduction of benefits by sums
collected by " anyone else responsible."
Accordingly, we cannot interpret the disputed policy language
to allow Allstate an offset for those payments made by State
Farm in this case.
foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court.
The case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be
necessary and are consistent with this opinion. Costs of the
appeal are assessed against the Appellant, Allstate Insurance
Company, and its surety.
Tennessee Code Annotated Section
( 3) With respect to bodily injury to an insured
while occupying an automobile not owned by the
insured, the following priorities of recovery under
uninsured motorist coverage apply:(A) The uninsured
motorist coverage on the vehicle in which the insured was
an occupant shall be the primary uninsured motorist