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Knox v. Colvin

United States District Court, Western District of Tennessee, Western Division

March 23, 2015

STEVEN HOLLIS KNOX, Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

ORDER REVERSING COMMISSIONER’S DECISION AND REMANDING PURSUANT TO SENTENCE FOUR OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(G)

JAMES D. TODD, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This action was filed by the Plaintiff, Steven Hollis Knox, to obtain judicial review of the Defendant Commissioner’s final decision denying his applications for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. and for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. Plaintiff’s applications for benefits were denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). At the Plaintiff’s request, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on February 11, 2010. (R. 39-58.) On May 27, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 21-31). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on November 14, 2011. (R. 1-6.) Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a claimant may obtain judicial review of any final decision made by the Commissioner after a hearing to which he or she was a party. The reviewing court may “enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Id. Judicial review is limited to determining whether or not there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the Commissioner’s decision, and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Lindsley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 604–08 (6th Cir. 2009); Kyle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir. 2010).

Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; Lindsley, 560 F.3d at 604-05; Kyle, 609 F.3d at 854. The Commissioner, not the reviewing court, is charged with the duty to weigh the evidence, to make credibility determinations, and to resolve material conflicts in the testimony. See Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007). In addition, if the decision is supported by substantial evidence, it should not be reversed even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiff was born on January 6, 1960, and has a GED. (R. 30, 43, 116.) He has past relevant work as an air compressor assembler, brake[1] press operator, and laundry detergent mixer/operator. (R. 29, 54.) Plaintiff alleges he became disabled on August 10, 2007, [2] due to a heart attack, back pain, and nerve problems. (R. 148).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the non-disability insured status requirements and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 31, 2007. She also found that Plaintiff’s back disorders (discongenic and degenerative) and anxiety-related disorder were severe impairments, but that his cardiac disease was non-severe. (R. 23-24.) However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not, either singly or in combination, meet or medically equal any listed impairment in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (R. 24.) She also determined that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were not fully credible. (R. 27-28). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform less than a full range of medium work. Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff could stand and walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday; could sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday; could lift and carry, and push and pull fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently; could frequently climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; had no manipulative, visual, communicative, or environmental limitations. However, he was limited to only unskilled, simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a non-production work environment, with no interactions with co-workers and supervisors, and no job interactions with the general public. (R. 24-26). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff could not do his past relevant work. (R. 29-30.) Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that he can perform. (R. 30-31.) Accordingly, Plaintiff was not under a disability at any time through the date of the decision. (R. 31.)

The Social Security Act defines disability as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). The initial burden of going forward is on the claimant to show that he is disabled from engaging in his former employment; the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate the existence of available employment compatible with the claimant’s disability and background. Id.; see Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing an entitlement to benefits. Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993).

In determining disability, the Commissioner conducts a five-step sequential analysis, as set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and § 416.920:

1. An individual who is engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found to be disabled regardless of medical findings.
2. An individual who does not have a severe impairment will not be found to be disabled.
3. A finding of disability will be made without consideration of vocational factors if an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the duration requirement and which meets or equals a listed impairment found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
4. An individual who can perform work that he has done in the past will not be found to be disabled.
5. If an individual cannot perform his past relevant work, other factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity will be considered to determine if other work can be performed.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). Further analysis is unnecessary if it is determined that an individual is not disabled at any point in this sequential evaluation process. Id.; see also Howardv. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 238 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, the analysis proceeded to step five, where the ALJ determined there are jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that ...


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