United States District Court, Eastern District of Tennessee, Chattanooga
HARRY S. MATTICE, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is a pro se prisoners’ civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. It appears from the application that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the $350.00 filing fee. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, plaintiff is allowed to proceed in this action without the prepayment of costs or fees or security therefor. For the reasons stated below, however, process shall not issue and this action will be DISMISSED.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
Responding to a perceived deluge of frivolous lawsuits, and, in particular, frivolous prisoner suits, Congress directed the federal courts to review or "screen" certain complaints sua sponte and to dismiss those that failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that sought monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief, or that were frivolous or malicious.
Id. at 1015–16 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that “Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”).
According to the complaint, plaintiff began breaking out with a rash and hives all over his body five to six months ago, while he was incarcerated. Plaintiff has seen the medical personnel at the jail numerous times for this issue and has been charged for these medical visits, but has gotten no results. Plaintiff requested “outside medical skin graphs [sic]” and received a skin graft on March 4th. The results of that graft were inconclusive, and no other graft has been taken. Plaintiff alleges that Lynn Roe, an employee of the Bradley County Sheriff’s Department, threatens him with solitary confinement due to his condition, and that Judge Donahue refused outside treatment because plaintiff cannot pay for it. Plaintiff seeks treatment by a skin care specialist/dermatologist, reimbursement for his medical treatment at the jail, and “possibly to file a claim for pain and suffering.” Plaintiff has sued the Bradley County Sherriff’s Office, Quality Correctional Healthcare, Dr. Bates (whom plaintiff states is the jail’s attending doctor), and Eric Watson (whom plaintiff alleges is the supervisor of jail lieutenants and staff).
1. Bradley County Sheriff’s Office
Bradley County Sheriff’s Office is not a suable entity within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 688-90 (1978); see, e.g., Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (a police department is not an entity which can be sued under § 1983), Smith v. Ritter, No. 1:12-CV-417, 2013 WL 3753984, at *4 (E.D. Tenn., July 15, 2013), Ambrose v. Knight, No. 3:13-CV-376, 2013 WL 3430840, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. July 8, 2013), Banner v. Hamblen County Sheriff’s Department, No. 2:09-CV-122, 2012 WL 1565385, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. April 30, 2012; Johnson v. Anderson, No. 2:07-CV-161, 2008 WL 4093352, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. August 28, 2008); Vega v. Harville, No. 3:07-CV-287, 2008 WL 1840742, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. April 23, 2008); Maroney v. Ward, No. 3:08-CV-38, 2008 WL 509532, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. February 22, 2008). Accordingly, any allegations against Bradley County Sheriff’s Office fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and Bradley County Sheriff’s Office is therefore DISMISSED from this lawsuit.
2. Denial of Medical Care
While the complaint contains no direct factual assertions involving Quality Correctional Health Care or Dr. Bates, construing the complaint liberally, plaintiff appears to allege that these defendants have failed to provide him with proper medical care. A prison authority’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Prison medical personnel or officials may be deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs “in their response to a prisoner’s needs” or by “interfer[ing] with treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–5. Also, “a prisoner who suffers pain needlessly when relief is readily available has a cause of action against those whose deliberate indifference is the cause of his suffering.” See Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1154–55 (6th Cir.1991)); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (“[T]he denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose”).
Where a prisoner receives some medical care and the dispute is over its adequacy, however, “federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in tort law.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976). By the same token, a difference of opinion between medical care providers as to appropriate treatment for an inmate’s ailment does not present a constitutional controversy. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–6; see also Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a disagreement between prison physician and physician who originally prescribed medications is not of constitutional magnitude).
Plaintiff does not allege that he has been denied medical treatment at the jail. Rather, plaintiff alleges that, despite multiple medical visits and a skin graft, medical personnel have not yet cured his rash, and have denied plaintiff’s request for blood work. Based on these allegations, it is clear that plaintiff disagrees with the course of medical treatment provided to him at the jail, for which he attempts to hold these defendants liable under § 1983. Plaintiff’s disagreement with his course of medical treatment does not establish a denial of ...