United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
JANE DOE # 1, et al.
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, et al.
J. CAMPBELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court are Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 105), Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 109), and
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike (Docket No. 133). For the
reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 105) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 109) is DENIED, and Plaintiffs' Motion to
Strike (Docket No. 133) is DENIED.
are female individuals who have visited and continue to visit
inmates in the South Central Correctional Facility
(“SCCF”) in Clifton, Tennessee. Plaintiffs claim
that Defendants have required Plaintiffs to undergo
humiliating and degrading searches when they have visited
SCCF, by forcing Plaintiffs to change their feminine hygiene
products in the presence of SCCF staff in small prison
bathrooms. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants subjected them
to these invasive searches without reasonable suspicion, in
violation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights and
resulting in various state law claims. Characterizing these
searches as “strip searches, ” Plaintiffs allege
that Defendants required Plaintiffs to expose their unclothed
genitalia to correction officials to verify that Plaintiffs
are Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”),
an entity charged by the State of Tennessee with the
authority to maintain SCCF, and individual officers of SCCF,
sued in both their individual and their official capacities.
claim that SCCF does not conduct “strip
searches.” Defendants argue that in light of the
prisons' serious concerns about the introduction of
contraband to the facilities, SCCF allows inmate visitation
privileges only within specified guidelines, including
visitors not being allowed to bring in their own feminine
hygiene products. Defendants contend that Tennessee
Department of Correction (“TDOT”) and SCCF
policies allow correctional staff to require female visitors
to replace their feminine hygiene products in the presence of
institutional staff if there exists individualized reasonable
suspicion to believe that contraband is being brought in.
parties dispute whether Defendants had individualized
reasonable suspicion to believe that Plaintiffs might be
bringing in contraband. Defendants assert that they had
reasonable suspicion, in light of the Plaintiffs'
histories, prior behaviors, appearances, and tips given to
the officers, to require Plaintiffs to replace their sanitary
pads in the presence of two female officers. Plaintiffs
insist that they were “strip-searched” without
reasonable suspicion, without a single specific, objective
fact tying them to any wrongdoing or suspicion.
parties also dispute exactly what happened when Plaintiffs
were required to take the challenged actions. Plaintiffs
allege that they were required to expose their unclothed
genitalia to corrections officers to “verify”
that they were menstruating. Defendants maintain that
Plaintiffs were required to change their feminine products to
be sure there was no contraband, not to verify that they were
menstruating. Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs were
accompanied by two correctional officers into a restroom,
where they were asked to change their feminine products while
the officers turned their backs so as not to observe the
Plaintiffs. The parties dispute the behavior of both
Plaintiffs and the correctional officers before and during
this time in the restroom.
ask the Court to strike the Declaration of Charles Fisher,
Defendants' expert witness in this case, for three
reasons. First, Plaintiffs claim that the Declaration is an
untimely-disclosed, new expert opinion. Defendants argue that
the Declaration is simply a summary of Mr. Fisher's
opinions previously produced to Plaintiffs, not a Rule 26
expert report or supplemental report. The Court has read Mr.
Fisher's two reports and Declaration and agrees with
Defendants. Any changing in the wording of Mr. Fisher's
Declaration from the two reports is minimal and does not
constitute “new” information. Moreover, any
differences go to the weight to be given his testimony, not
Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Fisher's Declaration
contradicts his previous deposition testimony. Again, any
discrepancies in the Declaration and the deposition testimony
are not sufficient to strike the Declaration and go to the
weight to be given his testimony, not its admissibility. In
addition, some of the examples Plaintiffs give are not
Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Fisher's Declaration attempts
to create a “sham” issue of fact. For the same
reasons as indicated above, the Court can read Mr.
Fisher's Declaration in light of any alleged
discrepancies, conclusory statements or legal conclusions and
determine the weight it deserves.
these reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike (Docket ...