United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Knoxville
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RONNIE GREER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
B Deramus, an inmate confined in the Morgan County
Correctional Complex, has filed this pro se complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 1]. Additionally, the Court is in
receipt of Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis [Doc. 2], motion to appoint counsel [Doc.
3], and motion for default judgment [Doc. 7].
on the analysis below, Plaintiff's motion to proceed
in forma pauperis will be GRANTED and his motion to
appoint counsel and motion for default judgment will both be
DENIED [Doc. 3 and 7].
on the financial data provided by Plaintiff, his application
to proceed without prepayment of fees [Doc. 1] is GRANTED.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”)
requires a prisoner who files a complaint in a district court
and wishes to proceed without prepayment of fees to supply
the Court with an application and certified copy of his
inmate trust account for the previous six-month period. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Here, Plaintiff provided a
self-drafted application, along with a print out of recent
activity on his trust account and a notarized certificate of
inmate trust fund account showing a total of $1.08 on account
to his credit [Doc. 2 p. 3 and 4].
Plaintiff is an inmate, he is ASSESSED the filing fee of
three hundred and fifty dollars ($350). McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007). The custodian of Plaintiff's inmate
trust account at the institution where he now resides shall
submit, as an initial partial payment, whichever is the
greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly
deposits to Plaintiff's inmate trust account; or (b)
twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in his
inmate trust account for the six-month period preceding the
filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and
(B). Thereafter, the trust account custodian shall submit
twenty percent (20%) of Plaintiff's preceding monthly
income (or income credited to his trust account for the
preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds
$10.00, until the full filing fee of $350 has been paid to
the Clerk's Office. McGore, 114 F.3d at 607.
should be sent to: Clerk, USDC; 800 Market Street, Suite 130,
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902. To ensure compliance with the
fee-collection procedure, the Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a
copy of this order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the
institution where Plaintiff is now confined. The Clerk is
also DIRECTED to furnish a copy of this order to the
Court's financial deputy. This order shall be placed in
Plaintiff's prison file and follow him if he is
transferred to another correctional institution.
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),
district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua
sponte dismiss those that are frivolous or malicious,
fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant
who is immune. See, e.g., Benson v.
O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
screening this complaint, the Court bears in mind that pro se
pleadings filed in civil rights cases must be liberally
construed and held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Still, the pleading must be sufficient
“to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face, ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007), which simply means that the factual content
pled by a plaintiff must permit a court “to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged, ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
“facial plausibility” standard does not require
“detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id. at 678 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). The standard articulated
in Twombly and Iqbal “governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A] because the relevant
statutory language tracks the language in Rule
12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,
470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).
January 15, 2016, Plaintiff was arrested on an outstanding
warrant and was taken to Tennova Hospital of Jefferson City
to be treated for injuries sustained during his arrest [Doc.
1 p. 2]. Plaintiff claims that he was “going in and out
of consciousness” and was “treated for a broken
hand” [Id.]. A partial cast was placed on
Plaintiff's wrist and he was given medication for the
pain [Id.]. Upon checking Plaintiff's vitals,
the doctor ordered Plaintiff to be hospitalized due to
severely high blood pressure [Id.]. Plaintiff was
placed on an IV and given blood pressure medication
[Id.]. Over twenty-four hours passed before
Plaintiff's blood pressure dropped to a “safe
level” [Id. at 2]. Plaintiff was prescribed
Narvask, a medication to control his blood pressure, and
Oxycodone, for the pain in his broken wrist [Id.].
following day, Plaintiff was released from the hospital and
booked into Jefferson County Jail [Id.]. Plaintiff
asserts that Deputy Cameron contacted Defendant Sheriff Bud
McCoig (“Defendant”) to request permission to