United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Chattanooga
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CHRISTOPHER H. STEGER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
Karen Snider, pro se, has filed an application to
proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1). Because I
conclude the complaint does not set forth a claim for which
relief can be granted and is frivolous, I RECOMMEND this
action be DISMISSED and the application to proceed in
forma pauperis be DENIED as moot.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court has the responsibility
to screen all actions filed by plaintiffs including
non-prisoners seeking in forma pauperis status and
to dismiss any action or portion thereof which is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim for which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. McGore v. Wrigglesworth,
114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.1997), overruled on other
grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); Johns
v. Maxey, 2008 WL 4442467 *1 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 25, 2008)
standard required by § 1915(e)(2) to properly state a
claim for which relief can be granted is the same standard
required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Brand v. Motley,
526 F.3d 921, 924 (6th Cir. 2008); accord
Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir.
2007). In determining whether a party has set forth a claim
in his complaint for which relief can be granted, all
well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the complaint
must be accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 555 (2007). “Specific facts
are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.'” Erickson, 551 U.S.
at 93, (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569-70.)
Further, a pro se pleading must be liberally
construed and “held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
brings this action against the United States and United
States District Judge Harry S. Mattice because two prior
pro se actions Plaintiff brought in this Court were
dismissed. Inexplicably, Plaintiff brings this action against
District Judge Mattice even though District Judge Curtis L.
Collier dismissed her two prior actions filed in the
Chattanooga division of the Eastern District of
Tennessee. She alleges the dismissal of her earlier
cases resulted in a denial of her due process rights and a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. She asserts a claim
against the United States on the ground that the United
States is liable to her for the conduct of the district
judges on the basis of the doctrine of respondeat superior.
extent that Plaintiff has asserted a claim against Judge
Matice or Judge Collier in her rambling and muddled
fifteen-page complaint, these judges are entitled to judicial
immunity. Judicial immunity attaches to actions undertaken in
a judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219, 227-229 (1988). An action taken in a judicial capacity
is a function normally performed by a judge. See Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). An act is non-judicial if
it is one not normally performed by a judicial officer or if
the parties did not deal with the judge in his official
capacity. King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.
1985) (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-59). Judge
Collier's dismissal of her earlier cases were actions
taken in a judicial capacity.
complaint alleges no conduct on the part of Judge Mattice;
her claims against him are completely frivolous and arguably
malicious. Finally, there can be no liability against the
United States under the doctrine of respondeat superior for
the conduct of someone who is not liable to the Plaintiff. In
sum, Plaintiff's claims are frivolous, lacking completely
reasons stated herein, it is RECOMMENDED this action be
DISMISSED with prejudice and the in forma
pauperis application be DENIED as moot.
IS SO ORDERED.
 In dismissing her action for failure
to state a claim and for lack of personal jurisdiction in
Case No. 1:12-cv-423, Judge Collier noted that Ms. Snider is
a frequent filer of frivolous pro se actions in this
This is not the first case the Court has heard from
pro se Plaintiff Karen Snider (“Plaintiff”). In
fact, the Court dismissed two similar cases against many of
the same defendants in 2010. See Snider v. Doral Dental,
USA, et al., No. 1:10-CV-19 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 2010);
Snider v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., No.
1:10-CV-22 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 2010). But this court is not
the only one. Plaintiff has filed numerous frivolous actions
in both this district and the Middle District of Tennessee
against these defendants, apparently seeking recompense for
unsuccessful past lawsuits.
Snider v. Steidley & Neal, PLLC, Case No.
1:12-cv-423, slip op. at 1 (May 31, ...