United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee
A. VARLAN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Court is in receipt of a pro se Complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 [Doc. 2] and an application for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis [Doc. 1]. It appears from the
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay
the $400.00 filing fee. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, Plaintiff's motion [Doc. 1] will be
Court must now review the complaint to determine whether it
states a claim entitling Plaintiff to relief or is frivolous
or malicious or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 607
(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
screening this complaint, the Court bears in mind that pro se
pleadings filed in civil rights cases must be liberally
construed and held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Still, the pleading must be sufficient
“to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face, ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007), which simply means that the factual
content pled by a plaintiff must permit a court “to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged, ” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“facial plausibility” standard does not require
“detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id. at 678 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). The standard articulated
in Twombly and Iqbal “governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A] because the relevant
statutory language tracks the language in Rule
12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,
470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).
alleges that her prior case was “not fairly
heard” [Doc. 2 p. 1]. She claims that “a true and
complete misunderstanding” of the judicial process
occurred [Id.]. She believed the Court would
“argue her case” and that she would be called to
the witness stand to give testimony [Id.]. Plaintiff
stated that she was “totally confused” when
neither took place [Id.]. At the time of her trial
in October of 2010 where Plaintiff appeared pro se, Plaintiff
claims that she was unprepared and inexperienced
[Id.]. Now, however, Plaintiff claims to have
learned “common law” [Id.].
with monetary compensation for Defendant's wrongdoing
alleged in her previous § 1983 complaint filed in 2009,
Plaintiff also requests that a new jury trial take place.
forth a cognizable § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must
establish that (1) she was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or the laws of the United States, and (2) the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
names Anderson County Detention Facility as the sole
defendant in this action. The Court finds that Anderson
County Detention Facility is not a “person”
subject to suit under § 1983. Rather, Anderson County
Detention Facility is a building which serves as a place for
confinement for those in custody. See Monell v. N.Y.C.
Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 689-90 n.53
(1978) (finding that only “bodies politic” are
“persons” who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. §
1983”). The Sixth Circuit, this Court, and other courts
in this circuit, have so held. See Marbry v. Corr. Med.
Serv., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir.
Nov. 6, 2000) (citing Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d
117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991)) (holding that “the Shelby
County Jail is not an entity subject to suit under §
1983”); Cage v. Kent Cnty. Corr. Facility, No.
96-1167, 1997 WL 225647, at *1 (6th Cir. May 1, 1997)
(stating that “[t]he district court also properly found
that the jail facility named as a defendant was not an entity
subject to suit under § 1983”); Russell v.
Juvenile Court of Kingsport, Tenn., No. 2:15-CV-13, 2015
WL 3506523, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. June 3, 2015); Brinkley v.
Loftis, No. 3:11-CV-1158, 2012 WL 2370106, at *3 (M.D.
Tenn. June 22, 2012); Seals v. Grainger Cnty.
Jail, No. 3:04-CV-606, 2005 WL 1076326, at *1 (E.D.
Tenn. May 6, 2005). Thus, the Court finds that
Plaintiff's claims against Anderson County Detention
Facility are subject to summary dismissal under §
naming Anderson County Detention Facility in the style of the
complaint, when asked to fill in the pre-printed form for
filing suit under § 1983, Plaintiff named as defendants
“Deputy Brian Hubbard, co Long, co Jade Fritz, co
Lumley, co Daridson, co Richard Parker, co Lynn Poluga”
[Doc. 2 p. 2]. Even liberally construing Plaintiff's
complaint to name the above individuals as defendants, the
Court concludes that Plaintiff's claims fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
failed to mentioned any of the above named people in the
substance of her complaint. It is a basic pleading essential
that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular
defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding
that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make
sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the
claim); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App'x 762,
764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims
where the complaint did not allege with any degree of
specificity which of the named defendants were personally
involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of
rights); Rodriguez v. Jabe, 904 F.2d 708 (6th Cir.
1990) (“Plaintiff's claims against those
individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is
totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest
their involvement in the events leading to her
injuries.”). Thus, even if Plaintiff had named
“Deputy Brian ...