United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Chattanooga
K. LEE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
the Court are the following motions: (1) a motion filed by
Attorneys Jerry H. Summers and Marya L. Schalk and the law
firm of Summers, Rufolo & Rodgers, P.C., (collectively
“Summers”) to withdraw as co-counsel for
Defendants James Hugh Brennan, III, Douglas Albert Dyer
(“Dyer”) and Broad Street Ventures, LLC
(“Broad Street”) and Relief Defendants Carole
Johnston Brennan and Alison F. Dyer (collectively
“Defendants”) with attached consents to the
withdrawal signed by each of the individual Defendants and a
consent by Broad Street signed by Dyer [Docs. 123 and 123-1];
and (2) a motion filed by Attorney Frank A. Lightmas, Jr. and
the Law Offices of Frank A. Lightmas Jr., LLC (collectively
“Lightmas”) to withdraw as co-counsel for
Defendants with similar attached consents to withdraw [Docs.
129 and 129-1]. Plaintiff U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“Plaintiff”) opposes only the motion
to withdraw filed by Lightmas, but only as it relates to
withdrawing from representation of Broad Street [Doc.
134]. Plaintiff opposes the motion to withdraw
by Lightmas as to Broad Street because a corporation must be
represented by licensed counsel to present a defense in this
action. Lightmas filed a reply [Doc. 135],  and the motions
are now ripe.
and Lightmas request withdrawal because, among other things,
they have been paid only limited amounts for representing
Defendants and have been advised that Defendants have no
available financial resources to pay for legal
representation. As a result, Summers and Lightmas and are no
longer being compensated for their representation of
Defendants. In their respective motions, Summers and Lightmas
represent that they have complied with the requirements of
E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.4(g) for withdrawal and have satisfied all
requirements to withdraw under E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.4(g) and
and Rule 1.16 of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct.
Summers and Lightmas also state that under these
circumstances, withdrawal is required pursuant to Rule
1.16(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct due to
to Local Rule 83.4(g) an attorney must send notice of his or
her withdrawal to a client within certain time parameters, or
the client may certify in writing that he or she agrees to
the withdrawal of counsel. However, “[i]f the client is
a corporation or other artificial person or legal entity
created by statute that may only appear in court through
counsel, the Court, absent extraordinary circumstances, shall
not allow the attorney to withdraw until the client has
obtained substitute counsel.” E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.4(g).
I FIND extraordinary circumstances are set forth in the
motions of Summers and Lightmas, in part, due to the
composition of Broad Street.
the motions to withdraw by Summers and Lightmas on behalf of
all Defendants [Docs. 123 and 129] are GRANTED. The Clerk is
DIRECTED to terminate them as as counsel of record for all
Defendants and to mail a copy of this Order to Defendants at
the addresses listed in the motions of Summers and Lightmas
[Doc. 123, Page ID # 1141-42 and Doc. 129, Page ID #1171-72].
fifteen (15) days from the date of this Order, each
individual Defendant shall either (1) have new counsel file a
notice of appearance on his or her behalf; or (2) file a
written notice informing the Court that he or she will
proceed pro se in this matter. Also within fifteen (15) days
from the date of this Order, Broad Street shall have new
counsel file a notice of appearance on its behalf if it
intends to present a defense to this action. All deadlines in
the Court's Scheduling Order [Doc. 120] remain in effect.
are forewarned that they each must comply with all
requirements of the Court's orders and local rules or
risk default judgment being entered against them in this
action upon appropriate motion.
 The Court finds it is unnecessary to
address the assertions of both Plaintiff and Lightmas that
the other has made untimely filings. As Plaintiff did not
file any objection to the Summers' motion, the Court
deems the failure to respond as a waiver of any objection to
the relief requested by Summers. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.2.
 Attorney Lightmas contends in his
reply that because he is only admitted pro hac vice,
if local counsel is allowed to withdraw, then he could not
continue to represent Broad Street as he is not admitted to
practice in the Eastern District of Tennessee. Attorney
Lightmas' argument is mistaken because admission pro
hac vice in this Court is not predicated upon
representation and involvement of local counsel.
 Both Summers and Lightmas filed a
consent to withdraw on behalf of Broad Street Dated:ly by
Dyer as its representative member [Doc. 123, Page ID # 1146
and Doc. 129, Page ID # 1176]. The motions of Summers and
Lightmas state that Dyer and Brennan are the only two members
of Broad Street and each has a fifty percent interest in the
company and that “Broad Street has no employees, no
shareholders, and no one else that is associated with it or
has an interest in the company” and “100% of the
ownership interest in Broad Street is held by Dyer and
Brennan.” [Doc. 123, Page ID # 1140]. Dyer and Brennan
have each consented to the withdrawal individually. While
Plaintiff appears to question ...