Assigned on Briefs February 7, 2017
from the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County No. 6918 Joe H.
Walker, III, Judge
petitioner, Roosevelt Bigbee, appeals the dismissal of his
habeas corpus petition in which he alleged the felony murder
indictment upon which he was convicted and incarcerated to be
void. The petitioner asserts that because he was not
separately indicted for the underlying felony of attempted
robbery, upon which the felony murder conviction rested, the
murder indictment is void. Following our review, we affirm
the habeas court's dismissal of the petition as the
petitioner has failed to show he is entitled to relief.
R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit
Roosevelt Bigbee, Clifton, Tennessee, pro se.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; David
H. Findley, Senior Counsel; D. Mike Dunavant, District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Ross Dyer, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
Thomas T. Woodall, P.J., and Camille R. McMullen, J., joined.
ROSS DYER, JUDGE
1988, a Sumner County Grand Jury returned a two-count
indictment charging the petitioner with the felony murder and
aggravated robbery of Monty Clymer. After a jury trial, the
petitioner was acquitted of aggravated robbery, but was
convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death. Upon
review by our Supreme Court, the petitioner's sentence of
death was reversed. Subsequently, the trial court held a
re-sentencing hearing wherein the petitioner received a life
August 2016, the petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition
claiming the indictment upon which his felony murder
conviction rested was void. After its review, the trial court
summarily dismissed the petition. This timely appeal
appeal, the petitioner argues that because he was not
separately indicted for attempted robbery, the underlying
felony in the felony murder indictment, he did not receive
adequate notice of the charges against him. The State
contends the petitioner's claims are meritless. Based
upon our review of the record, we agree with the State.
corpus relief is limited in scope and may only be invoked
where the judgment is void or the petitioner's term of
imprisonment has expired. Faulkner v. State, 226
S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007); State v. Ritchie, 20
S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Davenport,
980 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). A void, rather
than a voidable, judgment is "one that is facially
invalid because the court did not have the statutory
authority to render such ...