United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER,
GRANTING DEFENDANT WILLIAMS'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND
DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE WHY DEFENDANT ROSS ALSO
SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
pro se prisoner Plaintiff, Ed Henry Loyde, Tennessee
Department of Correction (“TDOC”) prisoner number
365029, who is confined at the Hardeman County Correctional
Facility (“HCCF”) in Whiteville, Tennessee, filed
a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint concerns his previous
incarceration at the West Tennessee State Penitentiary
(“WTSP”) in Henning, Tennessee. After Plaintiff
filed the necessary documentation, the Court granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil
filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b).
(ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on
April 20, 2016. (ECF No. 15.) On July 13, 2016, the Court
issued an order that, inter alia, partially
dismissed the complaint and directed that process be issued
for two Defendants, Correctional Officer (“C/O”)
First Name Unknown (“FNU”) Ross and Dr. Lynette
Williams. (ECF No. 16.)
August 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the
partial dismissal. (ECF No. 18.) The Court construes the
motion as a motion for relief from the order under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Under Rule 60(b) “the
court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons”:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged;
it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
under Rule 60(b) is circumscribed by public policy favoring
finality of judgments and termination of litigation.”
Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trs. of UMWA Combined Benefit
Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001). For that
reason, “the party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)
bears the burden of establishing the grounds for such relief
by clear and convincing evidence.” Sataym Computer
Servs., Ltd. v. Venture Global Eng'g, LLC, 323 F.
App'x 421, 427 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Info-Hold,
Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir.
errors fall within the definition of “mistake”
under Rule 60(b)(1). See Cacevic v. City of Hazel
Park, 226 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2000). However, Rule
60(b) is not intended to allow relief from judgment merely
because Plaintiff is unhappy with the outcome. See Jinks
v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 250 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir.
Court is unpersuaded that any type of relief from the order
of partial dismissal would be appropriate in this case. In
Plaintiff's motion, he attempts to “cure” the
deficiencies in the complaint that caused the Court to issue
a partial dismissal. However, his arguments consist mainly of
conclusory legal statements that fail to demonstrate the
prior order was erroneous. Therefore, the motion to
reconsider is DENIED.
Lynette Williams was served with process and filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim on September 30,
2016. (ECF Nos. 22 & 23.) Plaintiff has not responded to
the motion except to submit another amended complaint which
is almost identical to the second amended complaint. (ECF No.
evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the Court must construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and accept all factual allegations
as true. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957). While the complaint “does not need detailed
factual allegations” the plaintiff must supply
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do .
. . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The
complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at
570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces . . .
demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). In
addition, “the tenet that a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. However, ...