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Loyde v. State

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division

March 15, 2017

ED HENRY LOYDE, Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ET AL., Defendants.

          ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER, GRANTING DEFENDANT WILLIAMS'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE WHY DEFENDANT ROSS ALSO SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED

          JAMES D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         The pro se prisoner Plaintiff, Ed Henry Loyde, Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) prisoner number 365029, who is confined at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility (“HCCF”) in Whiteville, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint concerns his previous incarceration at the West Tennessee State Penitentiary (“WTSP”) in Henning, Tennessee. After Plaintiff filed the necessary documentation, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on April 20, 2016. (ECF No. 15.)[1] On July 13, 2016, the Court issued an order that, inter alia, partially dismissed the complaint and directed that process be issued for two Defendants, Correctional Officer (“C/O”) First Name Unknown (“FNU”) Ross and Dr. Lynette Williams. (ECF No. 16.)

         On August 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the partial dismissal. (ECF No. 18.) The Court construes the motion as a motion for relief from the order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Under Rule 60(b) “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons”:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

         “Relief under Rule 60(b) is circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of litigation.” Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trs. of UMWA Combined Benefit Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001). For that reason, “the party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bears the burden of establishing the grounds for such relief by clear and convincing evidence.” Sataym Computer Servs., Ltd. v. Venture Global Eng'g, LLC, 323 F. App'x 421, 427 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2008)).

         Legal errors fall within the definition of “mistake” under Rule 60(b)(1). See Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2000). However, Rule 60(b) is not intended to allow relief from judgment merely because Plaintiff is unhappy with the outcome. See Jinks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 250 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2001).

         The Court is unpersuaded that any type of relief from the order of partial dismissal would be appropriate in this case. In Plaintiff's motion, he attempts to “cure” the deficiencies in the complaint that caused the Court to issue a partial dismissal. However, his arguments consist mainly of conclusory legal statements that fail to demonstrate the prior order was erroneous. Therefore, the motion to reconsider is DENIED.

         Defendant Lynette Williams was served with process and filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on September 30, 2016. (ECF Nos. 22 & 23.) Plaintiff has not responded to the motion except to submit another amended complaint which is almost identical to the second amended complaint. (ECF No. 24.)

         In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all factual allegations as true. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). While the complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” the plaintiff must supply “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces . . . demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). In addition, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, ...


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