Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, Nashville
Assigned on Briefs January 18, 2017 at Knoxville.
from the Criminal Court for Putnam County No. 02-0666 Gary S.
Defendant, Earl Vantrease, was convicted by a Putnam County
jury of aggravated robbery in 2003 and received a
sixteen-year sentence as a Range II offender. Thirteen years
later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee
Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court
correct an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily
dismissed the motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that
the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal
Vantrease, Whiteville, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Robert
W. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General; and Bryant C. Dunaway,
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of
H. Montgomery, Jr., J., delivered the opinion of the court,
in which James Curwood Witt, Jr., and D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.,
H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE.
2003, the Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and
received a sixteen-year sentence. Although he did not appeal
his conviction or sentence, the Defendant unsuccessfully
sought habeas corpus relief. See Earl Vantrease, Jr. v.
State, No. M2012-02023-CCA-R3-HC, 2013 WL 1 896929
(Tenn. Crim. App. May 6, 2013), perm. app. denied
(Tenn. Nov. 13, 2013); see also Earl Vantrease, Jr. v.
Wayne Brandon, Warden, No. M2006-02414-CCA-R3-HC, 2007
WL 2917783 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 2007).
11, 2016, the Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal
and void sentence pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure
Rule 36.1. In the motion, the Defendant alleged that the
trial court enhanced his sentence using an improper
enhancement factor, that his sentence was improperly enhanced
based upon a previous arrest in violation of Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. (2000), that his sentence was
improperly enhanced "based solely on [the]
prosecutor's request, " rather than upon statutory
provisions, and that he was denied his statutory right to
allocution at the sentencing hearing. On May 12, 2016, the
trial court summarily dismissed the motion for the failure to
state a colorable claim. The court interpreted that the
Defendant's motion was to obtain pretrial jail credits
and concluded that the determination of pretrial jail credits
must be addressed pursuant to the Administrative Procedures
Act. This appeal followed.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing
his motion for the correction of an illegal sentence because
he did not allege he was denied pretrial jail credits. He
raises on appeal the same allegations stated in his written
motion and requests that this court review his sentence for
plain error. The State responds that although the trial court
erroneously determined that the basis for the Defendant's
motion was related to pretrial jail credits, the Defendant
nonetheless failed to state a colorable for relief. We agree
with the State.
Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 states, in relevant part, that
(a) Either the defendant or the state may, at any time, seek
the correction of an illegal sentence by filing a motion to
correct an illegal sentence in the trial court in which the
judgment of conviction was entered. For purposes of this
rule, an illegal sentence is one that is not authorized by
the applicable statutes or that directly contravenes an
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a). A defendant is entitled to a
hearing and the appointment of counsel if the motion states a