Assigned on Briefs March 7, 2017
from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. 08-07626 Lee V.
defendant, William Crayton, appeals the summary dismissal of
his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal
sentence imposed for his 2009 Shelby County Criminal Court
jury conviction of criminal attempt to commit first degree
murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.
R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court
William Crayton, Clifton, Tennessee, pro se.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; David
H. Findley, Assistant Attorney General; and Amy P. Weirich,
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of
Curwood Witt, Jr., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in
which Thomas T. Woodall, P.J., and Robert L. Holloway, Jr.,
CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE.
Shelby County Grand Jury charged the defendant with criminal
attempt to commit first degree murder and employing a firearm
during the commission of a dangerous felony. A Shelby County
Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant of criminal
attempt to commit first degree murder, and the trial court
dismissed the firearm charge on the basis that the underlying
offense was "'not an enumerated offense for which
the jury could return a verdict on the second count of that
indictment.'" State v. William Crayton,
No.W2009-02573-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 5 (Tenn. Crim. App,
Jackson, Jan. 13, 2012). Following a sentencing hearing, the
trial court sentenced the defendant as a repeat violent
offender and imposed a sentence of life without parole.
Id. This court affirmed the conviction and sentence
on direct appeal. See id., slip op. at 1.
8, 2016, the defendant moved the trial court under Rule 36.1
to correct his sentence, arguing that the trial court
erroneously allowed the State to impeach him at trial with a
prior second degree murder conviction that was more than 10
years old and that "the trial court failed to file
proper notice to seek enhanced sentencing pursuant to T.C.A.
[§] 40-35-202(a), " thus requiring resentencing of
the defendant as a Range I offender. The trial court
summarily dismissed the motion via a written order filed on
June 21, 2016.
appeal, the defendant reiterates his claim of entitlement to
Rule 36.1 relief, generally arguing that his sentence was
unauthorized due to his characterization as a repeat violent
offender. The defendant also raises new issues on appeal,
challenging the language in his indictment and claiming that
the State withheld evidence "to support his illegal
sentence claim, " violating the tenets of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
36.1 provides the defendant and the State an avenue to
"seek the correction of an illegal sentence, "
defined as a sentence "that is not authorized by the
applicable statutes or that directly contravenes an
applicable statute." Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1; see
also State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 594-95 (Tenn.
2015) (holding that "the definition of 'illegal
sentence' in Rule 36.1 is coextensive with, and not
broader than, the definition of the term in the habeas corpus
context"). To avoid summary denial of an illegal
sentence claim brought under Rule 36.1, a defendant must
"state with particularity the factual allegations,
" Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 594, establishing
"a colorable claim that the sentence is illegal, "
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(b). "[F]or purposes of Rule 36.1
. . . 'colorable claim' means a claim that, if taken
as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the moving
party, would entitle the moving party to relief under Rule
36.1." Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 593. The
determination whether a Rule 36.1 "motion states a
colorable claim for correction of an illegal sentence under
Rule 36.1 is a question of law, to which de novo review
applies." Id. at 589 (citing Summers v.
State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007)).
instant case, with respect to the defendant's issues
pertaining to his indictment and alleged discovery
violations, such issues were never raised before the trial
court. "Issues raised for the first time on appeal are
considered waived." State v. Johnson, 970
S.W.2d 500, 508 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); see also
Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). To the extent the defendant addresses
the issues that were before the trial court, he merely makes
a conclusory statement - styled as an issue heading - that
his sentence was unauthorized due to the improper imposition
of repeat violent offender status which "adversely
affected" his rights; this issue is unsupported by any
argument, citation to authorities, or citation to the record.
As such, that issue has also been waived. See Tenn.
Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b) ("Issues which are not supported
by argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate
references to the record will be treated as waived in this
court."). In any event, the defendant was convicted of
criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, a Class A
felony. Because the record before us establishes that the