United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL
WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF
APPELLATE FILING FEE
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6, 2016, Plaintiff William Davidson Hamby, Jr.
(“Hamby”), an inmate who is currently
incarcerated at the Morgan County Correctional Complex
(“MCCX”), in Wartburg, Tennessee, filed a pro
se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. (ECF No.
1.) The original complaint concerns Hamby's previous
incarcerations at the Deberry Special Needs Facility
(“DSNF”) in Nashville, Tennessee and the West
Tennessee State Penitentiary (“WTSP”) in Henning,
Tennessee. On May 23, 2016, U.S. District Judge Richard G.
Andrews transferred the case to this district. (ECF No. 4.)
After Hamby filed the necessary documentation, the Court
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 14.)
original complaint, Hamby sued WTSP physician Dr.
Benitez; DSNF physician Dr. Molly O'Toole; WTSP
Nurse Sanders; Corizon Health, Inc.
(“Corizon”);and the unknown Chief Medical Officer at
the WTSP. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) However, on June 3, 2016, Hamby
filed a motion to amend to remove Defendants Sanders and
Benitez from this action. (ECF No. 5.) On March 21, 2017, the
Court granted that motion. (ECF No. 61 at 2.) The March 21
order also addressed Hamby's numerous other pending
motions (id. at 2-6), severed the claims concerning
his incarceration at the DSNF and transferred them to the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
(id. at 6-7), and also severed the claims concerning
Hamby's incarceration at the MCCX, transferring them to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
(id. at 7-8). Thus, the only remaining claims in
this case are any claims against Defendant Corizon Health
arising from Hamby's incarceration at the
original complaint, Hamby alleged that after he was
transferred from the DSNF to the WTSP his health deteriorated
because Defendant Corizon's employees acted with racial
bias and neglect in the provision of medical services,
resulting in him receiving no doctor's help and no
medication. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Specifically, Hamby alleges he
was denied treatment for hepatitis C and coccidioidomycosis
(“Valley Fever”) and was denied medications for
neuropathy and high cholesterol. (Id. at 2.) Hamby
further alleges that he suffers from stage 3 hepatitis C,
neuropathy, and has had multiple documented injuries and
surgeries. (Id.) He contends that the lack of
medical care at the WTSP caused him pain and suffering which
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, yet white inmates
were assisted. (Id. at 3.)
seeks both monetary compensation and injunctive relief.
Screening and Standard
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the standards under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007),
are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true, the Court
‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint
to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.'” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d
380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . .
are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see
also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2)
still requires a ‘showing, ' rather than a blanket
assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual
allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant
could satisfy the requirement of providing not only
‘fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also
‘grounds' on which the claim rests.”).
complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any
complaint that is legally frivolous would ipso facto
fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 ...