United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
A. TRAUGER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
plaintiff Mardoche Olivier, proceeding pro se, has
filed a civil rights complaint against defendant Ross H.
Hicks. (ECF No. 1.) Additionally, the plaintiff has applied to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2)
it is apparent from the plaintiff's application that he
lacks sufficient resources from which to pay the required
filing fee, his application to proceed in forma
pauperis (ECF No. 2) will be granted.
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to
conduct an initial review of any complaint filed in forma
pauperis and to dismiss the complaint if it is facially
frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Begola v. Brown, 172 F.3d 47 (Table), 1998 WL
894722, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1998) (citing McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007)). The Court must construe a pro se
plaintiff's complaint liberally, Boag v.
McDaniel, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982), and accept the
plaintiff's allegations as true unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
these standards, the plaintiff's action will be dismissed
because he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted and because he seeks relief against a defendant who
is immune from suit.
complaint, the plaintiff alleges that on December 9, 2016, he
filed an inverse condemnation suit against the City of
Clarksville and sought to proceed as a pauper under state
law. On December 13, 2016, the defendant allegedly
“instructed clerks not to all [sic] [the plaintiff] to
file any civil complaints stating that plaintiff must pay all
costs in previously dismissed cases before he will be allowed
to proceed on further cases on a[n] indigency basis.”
(ECF No. 1 at Paged ID# 2.) The plaintiff alleges that the
defendant unlawfully dismissed his prior lawsuits to protect
the City of Clarksville and its employees from suit. The
plaintiff claims that the defendant has violated his rights
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.
relief, the plaintiff seeks monetary damages and an
injunction restricting the defendant from being a judge in
the plaintiff's court cases.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
action is filed in forma pauperis, “the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines
that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In assessing whether the complaint in this
case states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court
applies the standards under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, as construed by Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009), and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007).
See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir.
2010) (holding that “the dismissal standard articulated
in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for
failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)]
because the relevant statutory language tracks the language
in Rule 12(b)(6)”). “Accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true, the Court
‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint
to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.'” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d
380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . .
are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see
also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2)
still requires a ‘showing, ' rather than a blanket
assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual
allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant
could satisfy the requirement of providing not only
‘fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also
‘grounds' on which the claim rests.”).
se complaints are to be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and should therefore be
liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Pro
se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
The Court is not required to create a claim for the
plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins.
Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975); see also
Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F.App'x 608, 613 (6th Cir.
2011) (“[A] court cannot create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Payne v.
Sec'y of Treas., 73 F. App'x 836, 837 (6th Cir.
2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) and stating,
“[n]either this court nor the district court is
required to create Payne's claim for her”).
plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated his rights
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 when the defendant
unlawfully dismissed the plaintiff's previous lawsuits
and when he prohibited the plaintiff from filing any more
lawsuits as a pauper under state law, until he paid
outstanding costs due in connection with previously dismissed
for the sake of argument that the plaintiff could ever state
a §1983 claim in connection with the adjudication of his
lawsuits in state court, neither §§ 241 nor 242
provide for a private right of action. See Davis v.
Sarles, 134 F.Supp.3d 223, 228 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting
that 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 are federal criminal
statutes and do not create a private right of action);
Diaz Aviation Corp. v. Airport Aviation Servs.,
Inc., 762 F.Supp.2d 388, 393 (D.P.R. 2011) (same);
Peabody v. United States, 394 F.2d 175 ...