United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee
A. VARLAN CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
civil case is before the Court on plaintiff's Motion for
Voluntary Dismissal of State Automobile Mutual Insurance
Company's Cause of Action Against Fireman Fire
Protection, Inc., James G. Stone, III and Robin Aletras
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 41(a)(2) [Doc. 73]. Defendants did not
respond, and the time to do so has passed. E.D. Tenn. L.R.
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) provides that any action may
be dismissed at the plaintiff's request by court order,
on terms that the Court considers proper. Upon review of Rule
41 and the record in this case, and in light of the lack of
opposition from defendants, the Court will grant
plaintiff's Motion for Voluntary Dismissal [Doc. 73] and
will dismiss without prejudice plaintiff's claims against
defendants Fireman Fire Protection, Inc.
(“Fireman”), James G. Stone, III (“Stone
III”), and Robin Aletras (“Aletras”)
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
only claims remaining are intervening plaintiffs James G.
Stone, Jr. and Betty R. Stone's cause of action against
Aletras [Doc. 31] and defendants Fireman and Stone III's
cross-claims against Aletras [Doc. 27 pp. 9-10]. For the
following reasons, the Court will sua sponte dismiss
these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
matter jurisdiction is always a threshold determination,
” Am. Telecom Co. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501
F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101
(1998)), and may be raised by the Court sua sponte
at any stage in the proceedings. See United States v.
Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995) (“The federal
courts are under an independent obligation to examine their
own jurisdiction.”); Shultz v. Gen. R.V. Ctr.,
512 F.3d 754, 756 (6th Cir. 2008); Ford v. Hamilton
Invs., Inc., 29 F.3d 255, 257 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting
that subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that “may
be raised at any time, by any party or even sua
sponte by the court itself” (quotation omitted)).
“If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
federal court has original subject matter jurisdiction over
two types of actions. The first type involves those actions
raising a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The second
type involves those actions where there is diversity of
citizenship and an amount in controversy greater than $75,
000, excluding costs and fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Generally, “[d]iversity jurisdiction in the district
court requires complete diversity, i.e., none of the
defendants can be citizens of the same state as any of the
plaintiffs.” Maiden v. N. Am. Stainless, L.P.,
125 F. App'x 1, 3 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
Federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction “over all
other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Court has reviewed the intervening plaintiffs' claims,
and defendants Stone III and Fireman's cross-claims
against Aletras, and it does not appear that there is
complete diversity of citizenship among the parties as to
these claims, seeing as all relevant parties are citizens of
Tennessee. Thus, the Court does not possess subject matter
jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332. Furthermore, the remaining claims consist of negligence
causes of action against Aletras, so the Court does not have
federal question jurisdiction over these claims. 28 U.S.C.
regard to the Court's potential supplemental jurisdiction
over the claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a district
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
a claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)
(“The district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a)
if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.”). As discussed
herein, the Court will dismiss the only claims over which it
has original jurisdiction in this case based on
plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal, and the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
intervening plaintiff's claims against Aletras, as well
as over Fireman and Stone III's cross-claims.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss these claims.
in sum, the Court will GRANT plaintiff's Motion for
Voluntary Dismissal [Doc. 73] and will DISMISS without
prejudice plaintiff's claims against defendants Fireman,
Stone III, and Aletras, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, the Court will
DISMISS intervening plaintiffs' Complaint [Doc. 31] and
defendants Fireman and Stone III's cross-claims against