United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
DAVEN DECARLO TURNER, No. 237292, Plaintiff
R. BAINES, et al., Defendants.
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR. CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Daven Decarlo Turner, an inmate of the Metro-Davidson County
Detention Facility in Nashville, Tennessee, filed this
pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against R. Baines, J. Rychen, and D. Hall,
alleging violations of the Plaintiff's civil
rights. (Doc. No. 1). As relief, the Plaintiff
seeks the opportunity to earn sentence credits to which he
alleges he is entitled and asks “that the Defendants in
their official capacities cover and pay for all filing fees,
court costs, and attorney's fees concerning this
case.” (Id. at 1).
complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
PLRA Screening Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss any
portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis
that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires
initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity, ”
id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the
complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in §
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes
because the relevant statutory language tracks the language
in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on
initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court
must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts'
“duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro
se complaints does not require us to conjure up
[unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
Section 1983 Standard
brings his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any
person who, acting under color of state law, abridges
“rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements:
(1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590
(6th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
complaint alleges that the Plaintiff, an inmate of the
Metro-Davidson County Detention Facility in Nashville,
Tennessee, is housed in protective custody. According to the
complaint, protective custody inmates do not receive “2
day for 1" sentencing credits or “good
behavior” credits because those credits are only
available to inmates housed in general population. In
addition, general population inmates are afforded many
opportunities to participate in educational and
rehabilitative programs and are permitted to hold jobs
whereas protective custody inmates have access to fewer
programs and cannot hold jobs. The Plaintiff believes that
the current arrangement is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Constitution. (Doc. No. 1 at 3).
have no constitutionally cognizable right to participate in
rehabilitative or educational programs. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981); Moody v.
Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Canterino v.
Wilson, 869 F.2d 948, 952-54 (6th Cir. 1989); Kenner
v. Martin, 648 F.2d 1080, 1081 (6th Cir.
1981)(per curiam); Carter v. Corrs. Corp. of
Am., No. 98-6336, 1999 WL 427352, at *1 (6th
Cir. June 15, 1999). Thus, as to the Plaintiff's
allegations, the complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment
claim for cruel and unusual punishment upon which relief can
be granted, and that claim must be dismissed.
prisoner does not have a constitutional right to a particular
job, or to any job at all for that matter. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981); Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Newsom v. Norris,
888 F.2d 371, 374 (6th Cir. 1989); Ivey v.
Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6thCir.1987).
Rather, prison administrators may assign inmates ...