25, 2017 Session
from the Circuit Court for Shelby County No. CT-004089-10
Gina C. Higgins, Judge.
appeals from the trial court's decision granting a
judgment of possession to the Appellee bank. Because of
profound deficiencies in Appellant's brief, we hold that
her arguments are waived. Accordingly, the trial court's
judgment is affirmed.
R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit
Street, Memphis, Tennessee, Pro se.
Morgan, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellee, Chase Home
Steven Stafford, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the
court, in which Richard H. Dinkins, and Kenny Armstrong, JJ.,
STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE.
the second appeal of this case and a full recitation of the
facts may be found in Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v.
Street, No. W2007-02553-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 1462544
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2010) ("Chase
I"). The issue in both cases concerns property
purchased by Ida B. Street ("Ms. Street") and
secured by a deed of trust. The deed of trust was eventually
acquired by Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation ("Chase
Manhattan"). Id. at *1. Ms. Street participated
in two bankruptcy actions after her purchase of the property,
one finalized in 1998 and another finalized in 2003. At the
conclusion of the 2003 bankruptcy, Ms. Street's debts
were discharged. Id. Despite these discharges, Ms.
Street's debt owed under the deed of trust had not been
paid. Id. at *2. On December 24, 2003, a prior owner
of the deed of trust erroneously "recorded releases of
the deed of trust with the Office of the Register of Shelby
County, Tennessee." Id. at *1.
August 4, 2004, Chase Manhattan filed suit against Ms. Street
to set aside the releases, for the releases to be rescinded,
and for the deed of trust to be reinstated. In support, Chase
Manhattan alleged that the bank that recorded the releases
was not the current owner of the deed of trust and, in fact,
had not actually owned the deed of trust in over twelve
years. Id. at *1-2. The trial court thereafter
granted summary judgment to Chase Manhattan, set aside the
releases, and reinstated the deed of trust. While Ms.
Street's appeal was pending, she passed away and
Defendant/Appellant Jo Ann Street ("Appellant") was
substituted. Id. at *1. This Court ultimately
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
allowing the releases to be rescinded. Id. at *2-4.
Among other issues, the Court of Appeals specifically ruled
that Chase Manhattan was the proper owner of the deed of
trust and that Ms. Street's debt under the note had not
been paid. Id. at *2. Finally, the Court noted that
Ms. Street's bankruptcy did not prevent Chase Manhattan
from foreclosing on the subject property. Id.
meantime, on March 28, 2008, a foreclosure sale of the
property took place and the property was sold to
Defendant/Appellee Chase Home Finance, LLC
("Chase"). Immediately following the issuance of
Chase I, Chase filed a detainer warrant action
against Appellant on April 30, 2010. Judgment of possession
was eventually awarded to Chase on August 10, 2010. Appellant
thereafter appealed to the Shelby County Circuit Court
("the trial court").
proceedings in the trial court spanned numerous filings and
several years. At some point, Appellant filed a motion for
summary judgment, which was denied by the trial court on
January 7, 2013, after the trial court ruled that issues of
material fact remained in dispute. A trial on this cause
occurred in April 2014. During the hearing, the trial court
granted the parties a continuance to allow Appellant to
present proof that the loan had been fully paid. After
multiple continuances to give Appellant an opportunity to
file an affidavit in support of her allegations, the trial
court set the matter for a final hearing on November 20,
2015. On November 19, 2015, Appellant, by and through her
counsel, filed a document entitled "Affidavit of
Accounting." The document, however, was not an
affidavit, but merely a pleading that contained no proof. At
the November 20, 2015 hearing, the trial court gave Appellant
and her counsel until November 30, 2015 to provide the
proffered proof. Another hearing was therefore set for
December 2, 2015. On December 1, 2015, and again at the
December 2, 2015 hearing, Appellant's counsel notified
the trial court that there were no documents to support
Appellant's contention regarding the additional payments
made on the property after the 2003 bankruptcy.
trial court therefore eventually ruled in favor of Chase by
final order of January 8, 2016. The trial court held that
Chase had standing to foreclose the loan, that Ms.
Street's bankruptcy did not discharge her debt, and that
despite multiple opportunities and continuances, there was no
evidence of payments made on the loan after the 2003
bankruptcy. As a result, the trial court ruled that Appellant
was in unlawful possession of the property and therefore
granted possession of the property to Chase. Appellant filed
several unsuccessful post-trial motions and now appeals to
raises a number of issues in her brief, which we restate
largely verbatim here:
1. Whether the trial court did err in GRANTING a judgment in
favor of Chase Home Finance and giving them possession of
[Appellant's] primary residence that she shared with the
heirs of the late Ida B. Street, who died intestate, Probate
Case No.: D-6489, as a matter of law?
Can Chase claim to have foreclosed, but present no record of
foreclosure after none was found in the county record; and
present to the trial court an affidavit of debt from Beth
Cottrell, an admitted robo-signer, and an unrecorded
trustee's deed stating that [Ms.] Street was the grantor
and that the Secretary of Housing of Urban Development
("HUD") was the grantee. HUD submitted a statement
that the unpaid balance was $0.00 and the maturity date of
the loan was March 2011. The preponderance of the evidence
does not support the assertion by Chase they are the owner of
2. Did the court err when it failed to rule on the Motion for
Summary Judgment, pursuant to rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules
of Civil Procedure 52.01 in stating the reason for her
decision? In addition the plaintiff refused and failed to
respond to discovery requests as stated in defendant's
Response by Defendant, [Appellant], to Motion to Withdraw
filed by Kenneth Besser, ...