United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR. CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Wayne Vickers is an inmate at the Lovelock Correctional
Center in Lovelock, Nevada. He has filed this action pro
se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State
of Tennessee; the Tennessee Department of Correction; the
Cannon County, Tennessee Sheriff's Department; and
Charles Brandon, former Sheriff of Cannon County; seeking
to the Complaint (Doc. No. 1 at 6-14), in 1999, Vickers
received a sentence of two years at 30% for an unspecified
crime. (Id. at 8). After serving eight months of the
sentence in the Cannon County Jail, he was transferred to the
custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction where he
served an additional eight months. (Id.). On August
30, 2000, a warrant was issued for the Plaintiff's
arrest, charging him with vandalism. (Id. at 10).
This warrant remained outstanding until its dismissal on
April 6, 2017. (Id. at 8).
Plaintiff raises two claims for relief. First, he alleges
that he was forced “to do another 8 months that I
should have Not had to do.” (Id. at
10). He further complains that the outstanding arrest warrant
adversely affected his ability to obtain privileges at his
present place of confinement. (Id. at 9).
Tennessee, there is a one year limitation period for the
filing of civil rights claims brought pursuant to §
1983. Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794
(6th Cir. 2005). Under federal law, the limitation
period begins to run when the Plaintiff knows or has reason
to know of the injury that forms the basis of his action.
Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th
Cir. 1984). “In determining when the cause of action
accrues in a § 1983 case, we must look to what event
should have alerted the typical lay person to protect his or
her rights.” Edison v. Tenn. Dep't of
Children's Servs. 510 F.3d 631, 635 (quoting
Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 215 (6th
Complaint was signed by the Plaintiff and presumably placed
in the prison postal system for mailing on May 8, 2017. (Doc.
No. 1 at 14). Plaintiff's claims arose when he was
“forced” to serve an additional eight months in
the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (1999
or 2000) and when the outstanding arrest warrant issued in
August, 2000 adversely affected his current security
classification (a date that is speculative but clearly longer
than a year ago). Thus, it appears that this action is
time-barred by the one year statute of limitations imposed
upon civil rights claims brought in Tennessee.
Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398
course, the limitation period is subject to equitable
tolling. Zipes v. Transwold Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
384, 398 (1982). The Plaintiff asserts that “the
statute of limitations does not apply in this case because
the warrant tolls the statute of limitations.” (Doc.
No. 1 at 9).
doctrine of equitable tolling should be applied sparingly.
Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1008
(6th Cir.2001). The Plaintiff bears the burden of
showing that he is entitled to an equitable tolling of the
limitation period. Keenan v. Baglev, 400 F.3d 417,
420 (6th Cir.2005). To satisfy this burden, the
Plaintiff must establish (1) that he has been pursuing his
rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance has stood in his way. Pace v.
DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418(2005).
events that gave rise to the Plaintiff s claims happened
eighteen years ago. The Plaintiff has failed to show both
that he has been diligent in pursuing his rights and that
some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from raising
his claims in a timely manner. The Court, therefore,
concludes that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted because this action is untimely.
Dellis v. Corrections Corp. of America, 257 F.3d
508, 511 (6th Cir.2001 \sua sponte
dismissal of an untimely prisoner complaint is appropriate).
Under such circumstances, the Court is obliged to dismiss the
Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
appropriate order will enter.
 This action was originally filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Nevada
but was transferred to this judicial district to cure a