United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
MICHAEL HOSEA MCCORVEY, SR., No. 2440109, Plaintiff,
PRISON TRANSPORT SERVICES OF AMERICA, LLC, et al., Defendants.
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR. CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Hosea McCorvey, Sr., an inmate of the Orleans Parish Prison
in New Orleans, Louisiana, brings this pro se, in forma
pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
that Prison Transport Services of America, LLC (PTS), the
as-yet identified President of PTS, Officer f/n/u Jordan, and
Officer f/n/u Davison violated the Plaintiff's civil
rights while transporting him from South Carolina to
Louisiana. (Doc. Nos. 10 and 17).
Plaintiff initially filed this case in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. After
granting the Plaintiff in forma pauperis status, the
Honorable Jay C. Zainey dismissed some of the Plaintiff's
claims and severed and transferred the remaining Defendants
and claims case to this district by Order entered on May 23,
2017. (Doc. No. 20). The Order expressly stated that
“no ruling is made as to the sufficiency of the
complaint with respect to the claims that have been severed
and transferred to the Middle District of Tennessee,
Nashville Division, leaving that determination to the
receiving court.” (Id. at 1).
the Plaintiff's remaining claims and defendants are
before the Court at this time for an initial review pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
PLRA Screening Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any
portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis
that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires
initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity, ”
id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the
complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in §
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes
because the relevant statutory language tracks the language
in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on
initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court
must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts'
“duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro
se complaints does not require us to conjure up
[unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
Section 1983 Standard
brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title 42
U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any
person who, acting under color of state law, abridges
“rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements:
(1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590
(6th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
complaint alleges that, in October of 2016, the Plaintiff was
extradited from the Anderson County Detention Center in
Anderson, South Carolina, to the Orleans Justice Center in
New Orleans, Louisiana. He was transported in a van operated
by PTS. According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was
subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement
during the seven-day journey. Specifically, the complaint
alleges that the van was overcrowded and he was “not
able to take baths, or take care of personal hygiene for
days.” (Doc. No. 6-1 at 10). Except for periodic
bathroom breaks, the Plaintiff was on the van continuously
for five days of the circuitous seven day trip; the van
stopped for only one overnight break on the fifth day.
complaint further alleges that the van was involved in an
“almost fatal accident” in Atlanta, Georgia,
where the van driver hit another vehicle. (Doc. No. 17 at 1).
The complaint alleges that the Plaintiff suffered a leg
injury, loss of balance, and a painful ear infection during
the trip. (Doc. No. 6-1 at 10). Additionally, the Plaintiff
has developed arthritis in his right leg after the trip.
(Id.) The Plaintiff received medical attention for
both his leg injury and ear problem upon his arrival in New
Orleans but not until then. (Id.)