from the Circuit Court for Madison County No. 00-134 Donald
H. Allen, Judge.
se Appellant, Anthony Leon Moore, appeals the Madison County
Circuit Court's dismissal of his motion to correct
illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting
that this court affirm the lower court's denial of relief
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. Because the Appellant has failed to establish that
his sentences are illegal, we conclude that the State's
motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the summary
dismissal of the motion.
R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit
Court Affirmed Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court
of Criminal Appeals.
Anthony Leon Moore, Tiptonville, Tennessee, pro se.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter;
Caitlin Smith, Assistant Attorney General; Jerry Woodall,
District Attorney General; and Alfred Earls, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of
Everett Williams, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Alan E. Glenn and Camille R. McMullen, JJ., joined.
EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE.
2000, the Appellant was convicted by a Madison County jury of
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary for breaking into
a man's motel room and robbing him at gunpoint. The
Appellant's convictions and effective twenty-five-year
sentence were affirmed by this court on direct appeal, and
our supreme court denied his application for permission to
appeal. See State v. Anthony Leon Moore, No.
W2000-02862-CCA-R3- CD, 2002 WL 1482667, at *1 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Feb.11, 2002), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 8,
2002). The Appellant subsequently filed a petition for
post-conviction relief which was denied by the
post-conviction court. This court affirmed the denial of the
petition and our supreme court once again denied the
Appellant's application for permission to appeal. See
Anthony Leon Moore v. State, No. W2004-02039-CCA-R3- PC,
2005 WL 2205847, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept.12, 2005),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 6, 2006).
March 3, 2016, the Appellant filed a motion to correct an
illegal sentence alleging that his aggravated burglary
conviction was "in direct contravention of [the] express
statutory provisions" of Tennessee Code Annotated
section 39-11-109, "Prosecution under more than one (1)
statute, " which provides in pertinent part:
(a) When the same conduct may be defined under both a
specific statute and a general statute, the person may be
prosecuted under either statute, unless the specific statute
precludes prosecution under the general statute.
(b) When the same conduct may be defined under two (2) or
more specific statutes, the person may be prosecuted under
either statute unless one (1) specific statute precludes
prosecution under another.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-109. The Appellant argued that
the statute prohibited his dual convictions for aggravated
burglary and aggravated robbery because "the specific
statute of aggravated robbery and general statute of
aggravated burglary" involve the "same conduct
relevant to one victim, Mr. Larry Felts, and arising from the
same criminal transaction/episode." On June 30, 2016,
the trial court entered an order summarily dismissing the
petition on the grounds that the sentences were not illegal
and that the separate convictions for aggravated robbery and
aggravated burglary do not violate double jeopardy.
36.1 permits a defendant to seek correction of an unexpired
illegal sentence at any time. See State v.
Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2015) (emphasis
added). "[A]n illegal sentence is one that is not
authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly
contravenes an applicable statute." Tenn. R. Crim. P.
36.1(a). The meaning of "illegal sentence" as
defined in Rule 36.1 was interpreted to mean that the
definition "is coextensive, and not broader than, the
definition of the term in the habeas corpus context."
State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 594-95 (Tenn.
2015). Our supreme court reviewed the three categories of
sentencing errors: clerical errors (those arising from a
clerical mistake in the judgment sheet), appealable errors
(those for which the Sentencing Act specifically provides a
right of direct appeal) and fatal errors (those so profound
as to render a sentence illegal and void). Id. Fatal
errors are "sentences imposed pursuant to an
inapplicable statutory scheme, sentences designating release
eligibility dates where early release is statutorily
prohibited, sentences that are ordered to be served
concurrently where statutorily required to be served
consecutively, and sentences not authorized by any statute
for the offenses." Id. The court held that only
fatal errors render sentences illegal. Id.
the Appellant claims that his sentences are illegal, his
motion attacks the factual bases of his convictions. In
effect, the Appellant argues that by convicting him of
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, he has been
convicted twice for the same action in violation of double
jeopardy. This is not a cognizable claim for relief under
Rule 36.1. We therefore conclude that the trial court's
summary dismissal of the petition was proper. It is
well-established in Tennessee that the relief embodied by