from the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee at Nashville. No. 3:13-cv-01270-Kevin H. Sharp,
F. Mothershead, Nashville, Tennessee, R. Andrew Free,
Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant.
J. Oliver, Melissa Roberge, DEPARTMENT OF LAW OF THE
METROPOLITAN DEPARTMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY,
Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Before: MOORE, STRANCH, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Miller was arrested, charged, and indicted on charges of
reckless driving and resisting arrest, based on false
statements made by officer Woodston Maddox. The district
court granted summary judgment in Maddox's favor on
Miller's malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. We conclude that Maddox is not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law and is not entitled to either
absolute or qualified immunity. Accordingly, we REVERSE the
district court's judgment.
brought a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Maddox arising from her alleged
reckless driving and resisting of arrest. The district court
granted Maddox's motion for summary judgment and
dismissed Miller's complaint, reasoning that Miller could
not establish an exception to the general rule that the
issuance of an indictment conclusively establishes probable
cause, and that Maddox was entitled to absolute immunity from
a § 1983 suit based on statements he made to the night
court reviews a district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo. Jackson v. VHS Detroit
Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir.
2016). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute is
"genuine" "if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party." Ford v. Gen. Motors Corp., 305 F.3d
545, 551 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The moving party
bears the initial burden of establishing that there are no
genuine issues of material facts, which it may accomplish
"by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks
evidence to support an essential element of its case."
Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). In response, the nonmoving party
must present "significant probative evidence" that
will reveal that there is more than "some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts." Moore v. Philip
Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993). The
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
nonmovant's position will not suffice to avoid summary
judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
recognized that a plaintiff may bring a malicious prosecution
claim under the Fourth Amendment based on a defendant
officer's wrongful investigation, prosecution,
conviction, and incarceration of a plaintiff. Barnes v.
Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 715-16 (6th Cir. 2006). To succeed
on such a claim, Miller must establish that (1) a criminal
prosecution was initiated against her and Maddox made,
influenced, or participated in the prosecution decision; (2)
there was no probable cause to support the charges; (3) as a
result of the legal proceedings, Miller suffered a
deprivation of liberty "apart from the initial
seizure"; and (4) the criminal proceedings ended in
Miller's favor. Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294,
308-09 (6th Cir. 2010). The last element is not in dispute in
first insists that because, in affirming the denial of
Maddox's motion to dismiss, this court found in her favor
on the first and third elements, the law of the case doctrine
conclusively establishes that those elements are met and
precludes our review of those issues on summary judgment.
despite Miller's claims to the contrary, our prior
decision did not resolve whether her allegations of
post-process detention deprived her of liberty so as to
satisfy the third element. Rather, it mentioned, in passing
when rejecting Maddox's argument that Miller's claim
should be construed as one for false imprisonment, that
"the detention that Miller challenges is the
three-to-four-hour period of confinement that resulted from
the allegedly wrongful institution of this legal
process." Order, R. 20 at 4, Case No. 14-6216. We noted