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Jackson v. United States

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee

August 3, 2017

PATRICK M. JACKSON, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          CURTIS L. COLLIER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Presently before the Court is an amended motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by petitioner Patrick M. Jackson which challenges his enhanced sentence as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), pursuant to Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015).[1]In light of both Johnson and the recent en banc decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017), it now is undisputed that petitioner no longer qualifies as an armed career criminal under the ACCA. Accordingly, petitioner's amended § 2255 motion [Doc. 88] will be GRANTED.[2]

         I. BACKGROUND

         On May 25, 2010, a grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Tennessee returned a one-count indictment charging petitioner with possession of ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On December 14, 2010, petitioner entered a pleaded guilty to count one [Doc. 33].

         The presentence investigation report (“PSIR”) identified three previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, committed on occasions different from one another, that qualified petitioner as an armed career criminal under the ACCA: (1) a 1990 conviction for attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the Suffolk County, New York, Supreme Court [PSIR ¶ 28]; (2) a 1999 conviction for aggravated assault in the Hamilton County, Tennessee, Criminal Court [PSIR ¶ 34]; and, (3) a 2007 conviction for aggravated burglary in the Hamilton County, Tennessee, Criminal Court [PSIR ¶ 40]. As an armed career criminal, petitioner was subject to a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years to a maximum of life and an advisory guideline range of 180 to 210 months [PSIR ¶¶ 66, 67].

         On May 26, 2011, petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 180 months and a five-year term of supervised release [Doc. 52]. The Court's order denying petitioner's suppression motion was affirmed on direct appeal by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on August 7, 2012 [Doc. 60]. Petitioner's application for a writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on January 10, 2013 [Doc. 64].

         On January 2, 2014, petitioner filed a pro se § 2255 motion raising two claims of Fourth Amendment violations [Doc. 66]. On June 26, 2016, petitioner, through court-appointed counsel, filed an amended § 2255 motion challenging his armed career criminal status based on the Supreme Court's invalidation of the ACCA residual clause in Johnson [Doc. 88].

         The government's motion to defer ruling on petitioner's motion pending an en banc decision from the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Stitt, 646 Fed. App'x 454 (6th Cir. 2016), was granted by the Court on October 24, 2016 [Doc. 92]. On June 27, 2017, the Sixth Circuit issued its en banc decision holding that a conviction of aggravated burglary under Tennessee law does not qualify as a violent felony predicate offense under the ACCA. United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d at 856.

         On July 24, 2017, the parties filed a joint status report agreeing that petitioner no longer qualifies as an armed career criminal in light of Johnson and Stitt [Doc. 94].

         II. ANALYSIS

         1. TIMELINESS

         Section 2255(f) places a one-year period of limitation on all petitions for collateral relief under § 2255 which runs from the latest of: (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or, (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).

         Claims based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson satisfy the third sub-category- the assertion of a newly recognized right made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. at 1268 (Johnson constitutes a new substantive rule of constitutional law made retroactively applicable on collateral review); In Re Watkins, 810 F.3d at 381-85. The one-year limitation period for filing a motion to vacate based on a right newly recognized by the Supreme Court runs from the date on which the Supreme Court initially recognized the right asserted, not from the date on which the right asserted was made retroactively applicable. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005). Accordingly, Johnson triggered a renewed one-year period of limitation beginning on the date of that decision, June 26, 2015, and running until June 26, 2016.

         In this case, petitioner filed his amended § 2255 motion on June 26, 2016, which falls within the one-year window for ...


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