United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee
PATRICK M. JACKSON, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
L. COLLIER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is an amended motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed
by petitioner Patrick M. Jackson which challenges his
enhanced sentence as an armed career criminal under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. §
924(e), pursuant to Johnson v. United States, 135
S.Ct. 2551 (2015).In light of both Johnson and the
recent en banc decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
in United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir.
2017), it now is undisputed that petitioner no longer
qualifies as an armed career criminal under the ACCA.
Accordingly, petitioner's amended § 2255 motion
[Doc. 88] will be GRANTED.
25, 2010, a grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of
Tennessee returned a one-count indictment charging petitioner
with possession of ammunition by a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On December 14,
2010, petitioner entered a pleaded guilty to count one [Doc.
presentence investigation report (“PSIR”)
identified three previous convictions for a violent felony or
a serious drug offense, committed on occasions different from
one another, that qualified petitioner as an armed career
criminal under the ACCA: (1) a 1990 conviction for attempted
criminal sale of a controlled substance in the Suffolk
County, New York, Supreme Court [PSIR ¶ 28]; (2) a 1999
conviction for aggravated assault in the Hamilton County,
Tennessee, Criminal Court [PSIR ¶ 34]; and, (3) a 2007
conviction for aggravated burglary in the Hamilton County,
Tennessee, Criminal Court [PSIR ¶ 40]. As an armed
career criminal, petitioner was subject to a statutory
mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years to a maximum of life
and an advisory guideline range of 180 to 210 months [PSIR
¶¶ 66, 67].
26, 2011, petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of 180 months and a five-year term of supervised release
[Doc. 52]. The Court's order denying petitioner's
suppression motion was affirmed on direct appeal by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals on August 7, 2012 [Doc. 60].
Petitioner's application for a writ of certiorari was
denied by the United States Supreme Court on January 10, 2013
January 2, 2014, petitioner filed a pro se § 2255 motion
raising two claims of Fourth Amendment violations [Doc. 66].
On June 26, 2016, petitioner, through court-appointed
counsel, filed an amended § 2255 motion challenging his
armed career criminal status based on the Supreme Court's
invalidation of the ACCA residual clause in Johnson
government's motion to defer ruling on petitioner's
motion pending an en banc decision from the Sixth Circuit in
United States v. Stitt, 646 Fed. App'x 454 (6th
Cir. 2016), was granted by the Court on October 24, 2016
[Doc. 92]. On June 27, 2017, the Sixth Circuit issued its en
banc decision holding that a conviction of aggravated
burglary under Tennessee law does not qualify as a violent
felony predicate offense under the ACCA. United States v.
Stitt, 860 F.3d at 856.
24, 2017, the parties filed a joint status report agreeing
that petitioner no longer qualifies as an armed career
criminal in light of Johnson and Stitt
2255(f) places a one-year period of limitation on all
petitions for collateral relief under § 2255 which runs
from the latest of: (1) the date on which the judgment of
conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the
impediment to making a motion created by governmental action
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States
is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion
by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right
asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if
that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review;
or, (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson
satisfy the third sub-category- the assertion of a newly
recognized right made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review. Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct.
at 1268 (Johnson constitutes a new substantive rule
of constitutional law made retroactively applicable on
collateral review); In Re Watkins, 810 F.3d at
381-85. The one-year limitation period for filing a motion to
vacate based on a right newly recognized by the Supreme Court
runs from the date on which the Supreme Court initially
recognized the right asserted, not from the date on which the
right asserted was made retroactively applicable. Dodd v.
United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005). Accordingly,
Johnson triggered a renewed one-year period of
limitation beginning on the date of that decision, June 26,
2015, and running until June 26, 2016.
case, petitioner filed his amended § 2255 motion on June
26, 2016, which falls within the one-year window for