United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD
NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF
APPELLATE FILING FEE
THOMAS ANDERSON CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
August 24, 2016, Plaintiff Reginald Woods, who at the time of
filing was a pre-trial detainee at the Shelby County Criminal
Justice Center in Memphis, Tennessee, filed pro se a
Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accompanied by a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. On September
16, 2016, the Court granted Woods leave to proceed in
forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). The
Clerk shall record the Defendant as the State of Tennessee.
alleges that an arresting officer told him he was being
arrested for making a possible threat. According to the
Complaint, the caller reporting the alleged threat told
officers three different lies in the arrest report. Woods
specifically denies that there were weapons on the premises.
Wood also points out that an individual identified only as
Mr. Grady, who is not a party to this action, did not press
charges against Woods. Woods alleges that the charge was
dismissed and then refiled on May 8, 2015, exposing him to
double jeopardy. Woods finally alleges that he had an
additional exculpatory witness, though it is not clear from
the Complaint what her testimony would have been. Woods asks
to be released, to have the state drop all charges, and to
receive reimbursement for lost wages, job tools, and mental
November 18, 2015, Woods was indicted for criminal attempted
aggravated burglary and domestic assault with bodily harm
under indictment number 15 05811-15114158. On September 14,
2016, a jury found Woods guilty on both counts.
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
assessing whether the Complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the
pleadings standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), announced in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).
“Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual
allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original).
“[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions .
. . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a
‘showing, ' rather than a blanket assertion, of
entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the
complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the
requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice' of
the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on
which the claim rests.”).
se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, ' and
should therefore be liberally construed.”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro
se litigants and prisoners are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App'x 608,
612-13 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not
spelled out in his pleading'”) (quotation omitted);
Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App'x 506, 510
(6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require
courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf
of pro se litigants.”).
filed his Complaint on the court-supplied form for actions
under 42 U.S.C. ...