United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
WAVERLY D CRENSHAW, JR. CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Gore is an inmate of the Metro-Davidson County Detention
Facility in Nashville, Tennessee, brings this pro se, in
forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Core Civic Inc., f/n/u Rychen, Darrell Jones, f/n/u
Hebron, f/n/u Carter, f/n/u Sowers, f/n/u Andrews, and Jane
Doe, alleging violations of his federal civil and
constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 1). As relief, the Plaintiff
seeks compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive
relief. (Id. at 13).
complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
PLRA Screening Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any
portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis
that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires
initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity, ”
id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the
complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in §
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes
because the relevant statutory language tracks the language
in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on
initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court
must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts'
“duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro
se complaints does not require us to conjure up
[unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
Section 1983 Standard
Plaintiff brings his federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of
action against any person who, acting under color of state
law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state
a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show
two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that
the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590
(6th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff alleges that when he arrived at the Metro-Davidson
County Detention Facility on July 12, 2016. Upon his arrival,
the Plaintiff informed Jane Doe, the unidentified nurse in
charge of inmate intake, of his medical condition and of the
bottom bunk pass issued to him by the Criminal Justice Center
where he was previously incarcerated.
25, 2016, the Plaintiff was placed into Unit Kilo, Cell 222,
top bunk. After the Plaintiff advised an unnamed corrections
officer that he could not physically climb onto the top bunk,
the corrections officer referred the Plaintiff to Program
Counselor Hebron. Hebron told the Plaintiff that no bottom
bunks were available at that time but that Hebron would move
the Plaintiff when a bottom bunk became available. However,
even though three bottom bunks became available on the
following day, Hebron refused to move the Plaintiff. Later on
the same day, the Plaintiff attempted to climb onto his top
bunk. In doing so, the Plaintiff ripped his abdominal wall,
making his hernia “significantly” worse and
“severely [sic] hurting” himself. (Doc. No. 1 at
Plaintiff then told Captain Carter what had happened, and she
told the Plaintiff “she would take care of it before
lock down.” (Id.) At lock down when Carter had
not returned, the Plaintiff refused to return to his cell and
asked to speak with Carter. The Plaintiff was sent to the
sally port to wait on Carter. At 10:30 p.m., Sergeant Sowers
came to the sally port instead of Carter and told the
Plaintiff that if he “did not go back to [his] cell
[he] would be taken to punitive segregation.”
(Id.) The following day, Hebron moved the Plaintiff
to a bottom bunk in another unit.
August 1, 2016, Core Civic issued the Plaintiff a bottom bunk
pass. On November 1, 2016, the Plaintiff was moved to a
different unit, top bunk. The Plaintiff told Carter, who
again did not take any action. The Plaintiff ...