United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS F/K/A BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, Plaintiff,
MELODY V. HOLLOWAY, ANDREW L. LAWSON, AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF 7247 TIMBER VALLEY COVE, MEMPHIS, TN, 38125, Defendants.
H. MAYS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
the Court is the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation, dated March 14, 2017 (the
“Report”). (ECF No. 7.) The Report recommends
that “this case be dismissed sua sponte for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and be remanded to the
Circuit Court of Shelby County, Tennessee pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447.” (Id. at
On March 23, 2017, Defendants filed their objection to the
Report. (ECF No. 10; ECF No. 11; ECF No. 12.)
following reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Report of the
Magistrate Judge. The case is remanded to the Circuit Court
of Shelby County, Tennessee.
4, 2013, Plaintiff filed a detainer action against Defendants
in the Shelby County Court of General Sessions. (ECF No. 1-2
at 19.) The detainer action sought possession of the property
located at 7247 Timber Valley Cove, Memphis, Tennessee,
38125. (Id.) Plaintiff received a judgment for
possession of the property on July 3, 2013. (Id.)
Defendants filed an appeal in the Circuit Court of Shelby
County, Tennessee, on July 11, 2013. (Id.; ECF No.
1-2 at 25-26.) It is not known what transpired in the case
for the next three years. (ECF No. 7 at 43 n.1.)
March 6, 2017, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal to this
Court. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants stated that removal was based
on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), and 15
U.S.C. § 1692k(d). (Id. at 1.) Although the
signature line of the Notice of Removal printed the names of
Defendants Melody Holloway and Andrew Lawson, only Melody
Holloway signed the Notice of Removal. (Id. at 2.)
March 9, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No.
6 at 40.) The Motion to Dismiss argues that “the
actions of the Clerk and the remaining debt collectors are
void and without merit” and should be dismissed.
(Id.) The Motion to Dismiss also states that the
state court did not have subject matter jurisdiction or
personal jurisdiction, the state court was an improper venue,
the process was insufficient, and Plaintiff failed to state a
March 14, 2017, the Magistrate Judge entered the Report,
recommending the case be remanded to the Circuit Court of
Shelby County. (ECF No. 7.) The Magistrate Judge found that
the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction because
Plaintiff's claim does not involve a federal question.
(Id. at 46-47.) The Magistrate Judge also noted that
removal was procedurally improper because it was untimely and
because all Defendants did not join in the removal.
(Id. at 50-51.) Defendants filed a timely, although
improperly labelled, objection on March 23, 2017. (ECF No.
10; ECF No. 11; ECF No. 12.)
Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on the
federal judiciary by permitting the assignment of
district-court duties to magistrate judges. See United States
v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v.
United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869-70 (1989)). A district court
has the authority to “designate a magistrate judge to
conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to
submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and
recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court,
of any motion.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
district judge must determine de novo any part of a
Magistrate Judge's disposition that has been properly
objected to.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C). After reviewing the evidence, the Court is free
to accept, reject, or modify the proposed findings or
recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C). The district court is not required to review --
under a de novo or any other standard -- “any
issue that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court should
adopt the findings and rulings of the Magistrate Judge to
which no specific objection is filed. Id.; United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 950 (6th Cir. 1981.)
to any part of a Magistrate Judge's disposition
“must be clear enough to enable the district court to
discern those issues that are dispositive and
contentious.” Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th
Cir. 1995); see also Arn, 474 U.S. at 147 (stating that the
purpose of the rule is to “focus attention on those
issues . . . that are at the heart of the parties'
dispute.”). “‘[O]bjections disput[ing] the
correctness of the magistrate's recommendation but
fail[ing] to specify the findings . . . believed [to be] in
error' are too general.” Spencer v. Bouchard, 449
F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Miller, 50 F.3d at
380). A general, frivolous, or conclusive objection will be
treated as if no objection had been made. Howard v. Sec'y
of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir.
1991); see also Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir.
1986) (“[T]he district court need not provide de
novo review where the objections are ‘[f]rivolous,
conclusive or general.'” (internal quotations
only reference to the Report is their objection to the
Magistrate Judge's finding that the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. Defendants argue that the Court has
jurisdiction because “the Detainer action does involve
a federal question.” (ECF No. 11 at 115; see also ECF
No. 12 at 123.) Defendants argue that the federal question is
raised on the back of Plaintiff's “Detainer
Warrant, ” which contains a “FAIR DEBT COLLECTION