KEVIN J. MAMON
GEICOINDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
Assigned on Briefs August 1, 2017
from the Circuit Court for Davidson County No. 12C4564
Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr., Judge
appeals the dismissal of his claims against all three
defendants and the award of $400 to defendant Master Muffler
on its counterclaim following a bench trial. We affirm the
trial court in all respects.
R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit
J. Mamon, Michigan City, Indiana, pro se.
G. Offutt and Jennifer P. Ogletree, Nashville, Tennessee, for
the appellee, Master Muffler.
G. Clement Jr., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which Thomas R. Frierson, II, and Brandon O.
Gibson, JJ., joined.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
G. CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S.
Mamon ("Plaintiff") commenced this action on
November 8, 2012, seeking damages for a personal injury and
breach of contract. The named defendants were Geico Indemnity
Insurance Company ("Geico"), Master Muffler, and
Sam Owens, the owner of Master Muffler.
engaged Master Muffler in April 2012 to replace the engine in
a 1998 Jeep Grand Cherokee and contends that an agreement was
reached between his automobile insurer, Geico, and Master
Muffler pursuant to which Master Muffler would service the
Jeep and Geico would pay Master Muffler $1, 900 for the work.
Master Muffler insists Geico never agreed to pay for the
radiator; rather, Plaintiff agreed to pay for the service to
the radiator. Master Muffler acknowledges that it received
payment from Geico to replace the engine.
also alleged that he had to call Master Muffler daily to
inquire as to the status of the work. When Master Muffler
completed the work, it refused to release the Jeep claiming
that Plaintiff still owed $400 for the radiator. A few days
later, Master Muffler realized that the Jeep was missing and
notified Plaintiff that it had been stolen; however, it was
subsequently determined that Plaintiff used his spare key to
remove the vehicle from Master Muffler's premises without
the knowledge or consent of Master Muffler.
commenced this action on November 8, 2012. After a very
lengthy and onerous procedural history, which was principally
due to Plaintiff's acts and omissions, the case was tried
on May 4, 2016, and, not unlike many of the prior hearings,
Plaintiff failed to attend. At the conclusion of the trial,
the court entered a thorough order in which it recited the
procedural history and factual background, its findings of
fact, analysis, and conclusion. In pertinent part the court
This Court finds that pursuant to its Order dated November
23, 2015, this matter was set for a two-day jury trial to
begin on April 11, 2016. Despite the plaintiff being
incarcerated, this Court afforded the plaintiff the right to
appear at the trial via telephone and/or video/Skype. Since
the entry of that Order, this Court has heard nothing from
the plaintiff nor did the Court receive any request from the
plaintiff to appear for the trial by any other electronic
device. The plaintiff was previously instructed by this Court
in its Order dated January 9, 2015 to provide the Court and
defense counsel of his physical location and a mailing
address and upon any change in his physical location, and/or
"mailing address" to notify the Court and defense
counsel within 30 days. This Court notified the plaintiff
that his failure to do so would be grounds to dismiss the
plaintiff's case with prejudice. This Court has received
no such notification from the plaintiff of any change of
address, and as such, assumes the plaintiff has had no change
Therefore, due to the plaintiff's failure to appear for
the set trial after receiving proper notification or
otherwise notifying the Court of his request to appear for
the trial by any electronic device, the Court will dismiss
this cause for the plaintiff's failure to prosecute. The
Court finds that the plaintiff's pauper's oath does
not permit the ...