United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER AND FOR
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
pro se prisoner Plaintiff, Timothy Aaron Baxter,
filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No.
1.) On August 9, 2013, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's
§ 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) and 1915A(b)(1)-(2). (ECF No. 13 at
5-8.) The Court then declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims brought pursuant to
the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (TGTLA),
Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-205, dismissing those
claims without prejudice. (Id. at
February 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration (ECF No. 22), which the Court construes as a
motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b). Plaintiff states that following the
dismissal of this case and his appeal he re-filed the case in
the Madison County Circuit Court, attempting to revive his
claims against the State of Tennessee and Madison County
pursuant to the Tennessee savings statutes, Tennessee Code
Annotated §§ 28-1-115 and 28-1-105. However, like
this Court, the state trial court dismissed the claims
against the State of Tennessee on the basis of sovereign
immunity. Plaintiff's TGTLA claims against Madison County
were dismissed as time barred.
appeal the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed. Baxter v.
State of Tennessee, No. W2015-00078-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL
9946302 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015). The Court of Appeals
held that the Tennessee savings statutes could not save
Plaintiff's untimely TGTLA claims because those statutes
do not apply to governmental entities. Id. at *3.
The appellate court further held the remaining claims were
properly dismissed for failure to state a
claim. Id. at *4.
motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff argues that the
state-court decisions holding that his claims are time barred
are inequitable. He contends the state courts applied a
“different rule where a suit is filed in federal rather
than state court in the first instance.” (ECF No. 22 at
5.) Therefore, Plaintiff asks the Court to reinstate this
case and exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his TGTLA
Rule 60(b) “the court may relieve a party . . . from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged;
it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
under Rule 60(b) is circumscribed by public policy favoring
finality of judgments and termination of litigation.”
Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trs. of UMWA Combined Benefit
Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001). For that
reason, “the party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)
bears the burden of establishing the grounds for such relief
by clear and convincing evidence.” Sataym
Computer Servs., Ltd. v. Venture Global Eng'g,
LLC, 323 F.App'x 421, 427 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448,
454 (6th Cir. 2008)). Rule 60(b) is not intended to allow
relief from judgment merely because Plaintiff is unhappy with
the outcome. See Jinks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 250
F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2001).
motion for reconsideration does not fit within subsection (1)
of Rule 60(b), as he is not arguing that this Court
committed legal error; rather, his argument is that the
state court decisions were unfair. ...