United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Lamar Lattimore, an inmate of the Metro-Davidson County
Detention Facility in Nashville, Tennessee, brings this
pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the Davidson County Sheriff's
Department, the State of Tennessee, and “Core Civics
MDCDF CCA, ” alleging violations of his federal civil
and constitutional rights and state law claims of slander and
defamation. (Doc. No. 1). As relief, the Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages. (Id. at 6). The Plaintiff does not
ask for release from custody. (Id.)
complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
PLRA Screening Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any
portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis
that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires
initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity, ”
id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the
complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in §
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes
because the relevant statutory language tracks the language
in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on
initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court
must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts'
“duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro
se complaints does not require us to conjure up
[unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
Section 1983 Standard
Plaintiff brings his federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of
action against any person who, acting under color of state
law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state
a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show
two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that
the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590
(6th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
alleges that he has been incarcerated since August 20, 2015.
He entered a plea of guilty in state court to solicitation on
July 6, 2017, and was sentenced to time served. He was
transferred from the custody of the Davidson County
Sheriff's Office to the Metro-Davidson County Detention
Facility on July 14, 2017. He believes that he is being
wrongfully imprisoned beyond the expiration of his sentence.
(Doc. No. 1 at 5).
respect to the Plaintiff's allegation that he is being
held at the Metro-Davidson County Detention Facility beyond
his release date, the Plaintiff states a claim for violation
of his constitutional rights. See Shorts v.
Bartholomew, 255 F. App'x 46, 52 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]hat the right at issue is secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, is beyond
dispute: when a prisoner's sentence has expired, he is
entitled to release.”) (citing Whirl v. Kern,
407 F.2d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that
“[t]here is no privilege in a jailer to keep a prisoner
in jail beyond the period of his lawful sentence”));
id. (“[A]n incarcerated inmate has a liberty
interest in being released at the end of his term of
imprisonment.' (quoting Schultz v. Egan, 103 F.
App'x 437, 440 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Plaintiff sues the Davidson County Sheriff's Office, the
State of Tennessee, and the Metro-Davidson County Detention
Facility for violating his Constitutional right to be
released upon the expiration of his sentence. The Davidson
County Sheriff's Office, however, is not an entity that
may be sued under § 1983. Matthews v. Jones, 35
F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Mathes v.
Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No.
3:10-cv-0496, 2010 WL 3341889, at **2-3 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25,
2010) (noting that “since Matthews, federal
district courts in Tennessee have frequently and uniformly
held that police departments and sheriff's departments
are not proper parties to a § 1983 suit” under
Tennessee law, and therefore granting the motion to dismiss
the § 1983 claim against the ...