United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Greeneville
DARREN T. SCOTT, Plaintiff,
WASHINGTON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
S. MATTICE, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Plaintiff's pro se complaint for violation
of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 2],
and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
[Doc. 1]. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's
request to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1] will
be GRANTED and Plaintiff will be granted
leave to file an amended complaint.
currently an inmate at the Hawkins County Jail, filed the
instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Washington County Detention Center (“WCDC”) [Doc.
2 p. 1]. Plaintiff's claims result from his previous
confinement at WCDC [Id. at 2].
an inmate at WCDC, Plaintiff's hand was broken and
fractured when he was attacked by another inmate
[Id. at 3]. Plaintiff claims that the doctors at
WCDC took x-rays of his hand, but failed to take further
action [Id. at 4]. Then, Plaintiff states he was in
another altercation in October 2016, where he reinjured his
left hand, specifically his pinky finger [Id.]. At
this time, Plaintiff alleges that his pinky finger was reset
and he was told that he would need to see an orthopedic
surgeon [Id.]. However, he was never able to see the
orthopedic surgeon, as the nurses at WCDC told him for over
two months that he was still on the list for an appointment
but they were unable to tell him the date of his appointment
due to security reasons [Id.]. Then, on December 12,
2016, Plaintiff was transferred to the Unicoi County Jail,
and still has been unable to see an orthopedic surgeon
regarding his hand [Id.]. Plaintiff claims that as a
result of the delay in surgery, he has lost mobility and
function in his left hand, as well as suffered increased pain
[Id.]. He requests the Court to order his
“hand [to be] fixed, ” all medical bills paid
for, discipline against WCDC, and payment for his pain,
suffering and mental anguish [Id. at 5].
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), any
prisoner who files a complaint in a district court must
tender the full filing fee or file (1) an application to
proceed in forma pauperis without prepayment of fees
and (2) a certified copy of his inmate trust account for the
previous six-month period. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).
Plaintiff has failed to submit a fully compliant application
to proceed in forma pauperis, as his application
submitted on August 31, 2017 [Doc. 1] does not include a
certified copy of his inmate trust account. However,
Plaintiff claims that the jail has refused to notarize a copy
of his trust account, and attaches a copy of his account
balance over the past six months [Docs. 1-1, 1-2]. Therefore,
it appears from that application that he lacks sufficient
financial resources to pay the $350.00 filing fee.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis [Doc. 1] is
GRANTED and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915, the Clerk is DIRECTED to file this
action without the prepayment of costs or fees or security
therefor as of the date the Complaint was received.
Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Hawkins County Jail, he is
herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of
$350.00. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), the
custodian of Plaintiff's inmate trust account at the
institution where he now resides is directed to submit to the
Clerk, U.S. District Court, 220 West Depot Street, Suite 200,
Greeneville, Tennessee 37743, twenty percent (20%) of the
Plaintiff's preceding monthly income (or income credited
to the Plaintiff's trust account for the preceding
month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars
($10.00), until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty
dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. §
1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. §
Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this
Memorandum to the Hawkins County Jail to ensure that the
custodian of plaintiff's trust account complies with that
portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act relating to
payment of the filing fee. The Clerk is
DIRECTED to forward a copy of this
Memorandum to the Court's financial deputy.
the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and
sua sponte dismiss those that are frivolous or
malicious, fail to state a claim for relief or are against a
defendant who is immune. See Benson v. O'Brian,
179 F.3d 1014, 1015-16 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Congress
directed the federal courts to review or ‘screen'
certain complaints sua sponte and to dismiss those
that failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted [or] . . . sought monetary relief from a defendant
immune from such relief.”). The dismissal standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007) “governs
dismissals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant
statutory language tracks the language in Rule
12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,
470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review
under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must
establish that he was deprived of a federal right by a person
acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton
Citizens Hospital, 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998);
O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990,
995 (6th Cir. 1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati,
953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Braley v.
City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990)
("Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional
rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of
constitutional guarantees found elsewhere."). In other
words, the plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show: (1)
the deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured to
him by the United States Constitution or other federal law;
and (2) that the individual responsible for such deprivation
was acting under color of state law. Gregory v. Shelby
Cty., 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000).