United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A. VARLAN CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
criminal matter is before the Court on the Report and
Recommendation (the “R&R”) entered by United
States Magistrate Judge C. Clifford Shirley, Jr., on November
16, 2017 [Doc. 62]. In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Shirley
recommends that the Court deny the defendants' motion to
dismiss the indictment [Doc. 43] and deny the defendants'
many supplemental filings purporting to void the indictment
and other parts of the record [Docs. 42, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51,
52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57]. On November 30, defendant
Tucci-Jarraf filed a pro se document which the Court
construes as raising objections to the R&R [Doc. 65].
Then, on December 1, defendant Tucci-Jarraf filed a
“Declaration of Receipt, No Receipt, and Service,
” which the Court also construes as raising objections
to the R&R [Doc. 66]. Defendant Beane has moved to join both
of defendant Tucci-Jarraf's filings, asserting they are
similarly situated in that defendant Beane also believes the
Court lacks jurisdiction over him [Docs. 63, 67-68]. Finding
defendant Beane's motions to join to be well-taken, the
Court will grant those motions.
district court must conduct a de novo review of
those portions of a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation to which a party objects, unless the
objections are frivolous, conclusive, or general.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P.
59(b)(3); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers, Local
231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987); Mira v.
Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). “The
parties have ‘the duty to pinpoint those portions of
the magistrate's report that the district court must
specially consider.'” Mira, 806 F.2d at
637 (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404,
410 (5th Cir. 1982)). “[A]bsent compelling reasons,
” parties may not “raise at the district court
stage new arguments or issues that were not presented to the
magistrate.” Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d
895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v.
Waters, 158 F.3d 933, 936 (6th Cir. 1998)); see also
Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (10th Cir.
1996) (“[I]ssues raised for the first time in
objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are
deemed waived.”). The Court “may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations” of the magistrate judge. §
the Court finds that it need not conduct a de novo
review of any portion of the R&R because the
defendants' “objections” are frivolous,
conclusive, and general. In her first filing, defendant
Tucci-Jarraf merely obtained a copy of the R&R, handwrote
ambiguous remarks on the top and bottom of each page, signed
and marked each page with a red fingerprint, and refiled the
altered document with the Clerk of Court [Doc. 65]. Although
these remarks are difficult to read, almost all are some
variant of the following: “*Original Instrument*
Entirety, Duly rejected, without dishonor, for due cause.
Lacks due verification and validation, with signature and
seal, or presenter's [unknown word]: 1. Identification;
2. Authority; 3. Authorization; and, 4. Indorsement”
[Id. at 1]. Defendant Tucci-Jarraf also lists the
CM/ECF numbers of numerous docket entries in this case,
without elaboration [Id. at 1, 16]. And, on the last
page of the R&R, she has circled Magistrate Judge
Shirley's signature and included the following remark:
“**Special note: Doc 55, and Doc 54, and specifically
‘FINAL NOTICE, ' restated, still in
effect, and effect w/ clarification: not ledgered against any
individuals” [Id. at 16].
second filing, defendant Tucci-Jarraf explains the
circumstances under which she received a copy of the R&R
by U.S. mail, purchased a certified copy of the same from the
Clerk of Court with additional CM/ECF markers, and then filed
a physically altered version with the Clerk on December 1
[Doc. 66 pp. 1-2]. Defendant Tucci-Jarraf asserts that she
has “duly rejected, without dishonor, for due cause,
” the R&R on the ground that neither Magistrate
Judge Shirley nor the Clerk provided “due markings,
inclusive of due identification, date, indorsement,
certification, validation, or verification”
[Id. at 2].
Tucci-Jarraf has also attached altered and unaltered versions
of the R&R and copies of email correspondence among the
parties [Id. at 6-24]. She does not, however, raise
any additional substantive objections to the R&R.
Court first notes that Magistrate Judge Shirley included a
proper electronic signature on the final page of the R&R
[Doc. 62 p. 16]. No other form of “due verification and
validation” is required by any federal rule or statute
of which the Court is aware, and defendants have not cited to
any such requirement. Indeed, Rule 11 of the Eastern District
of Tennessee Electronic Case Filing Rules and Procedures
expressly provides as follows: “Any order or other
court-issued document filed electronically without the
handwritten signature of a judge or clerk has the same force
and effect as if the judge or clerk had signed a paper copy
of the document and it had been entered on the docket in
paper form.” Further, defendant Tucci-Jarraf never
specifies how Magistrate Judge Shirley and the Clerk
should have verified the R&R. Moreover, beyond this
issue, defendant Tucci-Jarraf's remarks offer no legal or
factual argument the Court could properly consider, and they
certainly do not “pinpoint those portions of the
[R&R]” under objection. Mira, 806 F.2d at
637 (quoting Nettles, 677 F.2d at 404). The Court
is, frankly, unclear what these objections mean, if intended
as objections at all. The Court is, of course, mindful of its
duty to “liberally construe the briefs of pro
se litigants and apply less stringent standards to
parties proceeding pro se.” Bouyer v.
Simon, 22 F. App'x 611, 612 (6th Cir. 2001). But
having searched defendant Tucci-Jarraf's filings for any
substantive objection to the R&R, the Court is unable to
locate any issue it could subject to de novo review.
the Court has independently reviewed the R&R and is in
complete agreement with Magistrate Judge Shirley's
recommendations, which the Court adopts and incorporates into
this ruling. Accordingly, the Court ACCEPTS IN
WHOLE the R&R [Doc. 62]. Defendant Beane's
motions [Docs. 63, 67-68] to join the filings of defendant
Tucci-Jarraf are hereby GRANTED.
Furthermore, to the extent they may be considered motions,
the defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment [Doc.
43] and supplemental filings purporting to void the
indictment and other parts of the record [Docs. 42, 45, 48,
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57] are all hereby
 In this filing, defendant Tucci-Jarraf
asserts that she was served with a copy of the R&R on
November 17, 2017 [Doc. 66 p. 1]. If so, then both documents
were properly filed within the fourteen-day window for
objections to the R&R. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
59(b)(2). The Court assumes this to be the case for purpose
of this opinion.
 Defendant Tucci-Jarraf also complains
that she incurred “unreasonable extra costs” by
having to file these documents via personal service because
the Clerk's office informed her on November 30 that no
personnel were available to electronically file the documents
[Doc. 66 p. 2]. She has also attached documentation of these
costs [Id. at 25-27]. This complaint does not appear
to be an objection to the R&R itself; nor does defendant