United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Chattanooga
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
K. LEE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
matter was filed pro se by Harry Louis Green
(“Mr. Green”). Mr. Green has filed an application to
proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1], a complaint
[Doc. 2], and two supplements to his complaint [Docs. 3 &
4] that are lengthy, disjointed, and confusing. Mr. Green
appears to be attempting to sue more than 35 attorneys,
financial institutions, trustees, companies, government
departments, and others, including police and sheriff's
departments in Georgia, Missouri, and Illinois and judicial
divisions in Illinois and Missouri, who handled his and his
wife's bankruptcy proceedings or were involved in debt
collection efforts (collectively, “Defendants”),
on a multitude of purported grounds. It is also possible that
Mr. Green may instead be attempting to appeal decisions of
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District
of Tennessee (“Bankruptcy Court”) on the same
grounds or attempting to remove a proceeding from the
Bankruptcy Court to this Court.
September 28, 2017, Mr. Green filed two purported supplements
to his complaint, apparently to name even more parties,
including U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Shelley Rucker [Doc. 3 at
Page ID # 58]. Mr. Green alleges that various Defendants were
involved in the unlawful seizure, sale, and destruction of a
motor home, cash, personal property, and unlawful seizure of
business property. Mr. Green also references allegations
concerning an estate and alleged wrongdoing in connection
with proceedings before the Bankruptcy Court, and he titled a
supplement as being a “Qui Tam” and
“INJUNCTION AND RELIEF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION MONETARY
JUDGMENT.” [Doc. 3, Page ID # 58]. Among other demands,
Mr. Green requests an injunction, an automatic stay, and
Green's rambling allegations mention violations of the
United States Constitution, the Hobbs Act via extortion and
bribery by public officials, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, misconduct, conspiracy and racial
discrimination by a judicial officer, trustee, and attorney,
unlawful destruction, alteration, or falsification of record
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, malicious prosecution,
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152 concealment of assets,
conflict of interest, breach of fiduciary duty, and
violations of fair debt collection practices 15 U.S.C. 1692
& 806. Mr. Green further asserts that the District Courts
and Article III judges have “exclusive
jurisdiction” over Bankruptcy cases and further
reserves the right for “Supreme Court Review on Appeals
of Lower Court.” [Doc. 2, Page ID #24, 30].
Green's filings include disjointed documentation
regarding a traffic stop, arrest, and seizure of property,
cash and money orders of non-party Cynthia M. Crawford Green
in Jefferson City, Missouri on fugitive warrants from Madison
County, Illinois and Franklin County, Tennessee. Though the
allegations are hazy and convoluted, it appears that Mr.
Green is asserting claims that somehow relate back to his
bankruptcy proceedings and various collection proceedings.
Yet, he failed to include a statement of the nature of any
attempted appeal of a decision of the Bankruptcy Court.
litigant may commence a civil action in federal court in
forma pauperis (“IFP”), i.e.,
without paying the administrative costs of t h e lawsuit,
when the litigant demonstrates he is unable to pay court
costs and fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A district court
may, however, dismiss such a complaint if it is frivolous or
it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii); see Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). The Court does not
need to reach the question of whether Mr. Green is indigent
in this case, however, because this action should be
dismissed or the reasons explained herein.
se litigants are given some leniency with regard to
pleading standards. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007). However, that leniency is not
“boundless.” Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d
710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide, in relevant part, that a pleading that
states a claim for relief must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief [.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)
(emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not require a plaintiff
to set forth detailed factual allegations, “it demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires
a plaintiff to give each “defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 545 (2007). In short, Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a
‘showing, ' rather than a blanket assertion, of
entitlement to relief.” Id. at 556, n.3.
Likewise, “pro se litigants are not relieved
of the duty to develop claims with an appropriate degree of
specificity.” Kafele v. Lerner, Sampson, Rothfuss,
L.P.A, 161 F. App'x 487, 491 (6th Cir. 2005)
(dismissing case where plaintiffs raised dozens of claims
that were lacking in both supportive factual allegations and
directed legal arguments).
Green's complaint and supplements total approximately 192
pages that fail to discernably assert a plain statement of
facts that show he is entitled to relief. The filings present
a disorganized narrative of irrelevant topics such as
criminal proceedings in Missouri involving a non-party,
copies of bankruptcy filings, internet articles, vehicle
titles, bank statements, and a rambling narrative of
proceedings before the Bankruptcy Court. Any relevant facts
are “confusing, ambiguous, redundant, vague, and in
some respects, unintelligible.” Wallach v. City of
Pagedale, Mo., Mo., 359 F.2d 57, 58 (8th Cir. 1966)
(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint). “A
complaint that is excessively long, rambling, disjointed,
incoherent, or full of irrelevant and confusing material does
not meet [Rule 8's] pleading requirements, even when [the
materials] are liberally construed in a pro se
litigant's favor.” Adams v. Dep't of
Treasury, No. 13-1967(RJL), 2014 WL 114687, at *1
(D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2014). As such, Mr. Green has not complied
with the pleadings standards required by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
pleading rules are not an arbitrary barrier to substantive
relief. They are intended to give adverse parties fair notice
of asserted claims and their factual basis. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 544. Further, the rules serve to “sharpen
the issues to be litigated and confine discovery and the
presentation of evidence” within reasonable bounds.
Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).
Mr. Green's sprawling complaint and purported supplements
fall woefully short of this mark.
I RECOMMEND that Mr. Green's IFP
Application [Doc. 1] be DENIED, and I
further RECOMMEND that Mr. Green's
claims be DISMISSED for lack of specificity
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See
Kafele, 161 Fed.Appx. at 491.
 On the first page of his complaint,
along with himself, Mr. Green has listed United States of
America and the United States Attorney General as plaintiffs
[Doc. 2 at Page ID #13]. Further, on the first page of the
first supplement [Doc. 3] he titles himself as
“Relator” and in addition to the United States of
America and United States Attorney General, he names United
States Justice Department and N.A.A.C.P., Notice
Department” (“only”) as plaintiffs [Doc. 3,
Page ID # 58]. Mr. Green previously attempted to assert
similar claims in another action filed in this district which
currently has a pending Report and Recommendation for denial
of Mr. Green's IFP application and dismissal of his
complaint for failure to state a claim. See Green v.
Knight, et al., 1:17- cv-227-PLR-SKL, Doc. 4.
 Any objections to this report and
recommendation must be served and filed within fourteen (14)
days after service of a copy of this recommended disposition
on the objecting party. Such objections must conform to the
requirements of Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Failure to file objections within the time
specified waives the right to appeal the district court's
order. Thomas v. Arn,474 U.S. 140, 149 n.7 (1985).
The district court need not provide de novo review
where objections to this report and recommendation are
frivolous, conclusive and general. Mira v. Marshall,806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). ...