United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
HAROLD G. HIBBARD, Plaintiff,
v.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, et al. Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR. CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Harold
Hibbard is an inmate at the Stewart County Detention Center
in Dover, Tennessee. He has filed pro se a prisoner
Complaint (Doc. No. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an
Application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2).
It
appears from the Application that the Plaintiff lacks
sufficient financial resources from which to pay the fee
required to file the Complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff's
Application is GRANTED. The Clerk will file
the Complaint in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Plaintiff
is herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of
$350.00. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B),
the custodian of the Plaintiff's inmate trust account at
the institution where he now resides is directed to submit to
the Clerk of Court, as an initial partial payment, whichever
is greater of:
(a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to
the Plaintiff's inmate trust account;
or
(b)
twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in the
Plaintiff's inmate trust account for the prior six (6)
months.
Thereafter,
the custodian shall submit twenty percent (20%) of the
Plaintiff's preceding monthly income (or income credited
to the Plaintiff's trust account for the preceding
month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars
($10.00), until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty
dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. §
1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk of Court. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(2).
The
Plaintiff brings this action against Montgomery County, John
Fuson, Sheriff of Montgomery County, and William Goodman, a
Circuit Court Judge in Montgomery County, seeking injunctive
relief and damages.
In
September, 2017, the Plaintiff was involved in an automobile
accident in Montgomery County. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) The
Plaintiff blames the accident on his “accelerator
getting stuck at a high rate of speed”, causing him to
lose control of his vehicle. (Id.) He was
“t-boned” by a truck. (Id.) When
Plaintiff's vehicle came to a stop, he managed to exit
the vehicle and found himself wandering in a field of tall
grass. (Id at 6.) He was dazed and confused.
(Id.)
As the
Plaintiff made his way back to the road, a police officer
ordered him to stop. (Id.) The officer handcuffed
the Plaintiff and placed him in the back of his cruiser where
he waited for a short while. (Id.) When an ambulance
arrived on the scene, the Plaintiff was moved from the police
cruiser to the ambulance. (Id at 7.) Paramedics used
something resembling smelling salts to bring the Plaintiff
back to consciousness, but did so for too long, interfering
with his ability to breathe. (Id.) They also took
his blood pressure and listened to his heart. (Id.)
The
Plaintiff was transported to a hospital. When he arrived
there, a physician stitched up a wound to his left arm but
did not prescribe any medication for pain. (Id.) The
Plaintiff states that “I believe that the Montgomery
County EMS and Police Department were not taking actions of a
professional. I feel they were using cruel and unusual
punishment.” (Id.)
Pro
se pleadings are subject to liberal construction.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Nevertheless,
liberal construction does not require the Court to create a
claim that the Plaintiff has not spelled out in his
Complaint. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th
Cir. 1989). A Plaintiff is required to plead more than bare
legal conclusions. Lillard v. Shelby County Board of
Education, 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, a
pro se litigant must meet the basic pleading
requirements for a Complaint in order to state a cognizable
claim for relief. Wells. Plaintiff must identify the
right or privilege that was violated and the role that each
Defendant played in the alleged violation. Dunn v.
Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 128 (6th Cir. 1982).
To
avoid dismissal, a Complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter when, accepted as true, states a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has facial
plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the
Defendants are liable for alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In this
regard, the Plaintiff does not mention any of the Defendants
in his Statement of Facts (Doc. No. 1 at 5). Thus, he has
failed to allege a claim against them that is plausible on
its face. As a consequence, the Court finds that the
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can
granted. Jackson v. Nix, 2007 WL 2317390 at 2 (M.D.
Tenn., Aug. 8, 2007); see also White v. Tennessee,
2014 WL 3908203 at 2 (E.D. Tenn., Aug. 11, 2014) (plaintiff
alleged no facts, much less sufficient facts, against
defendants named in the caption but not mentioned in the body
of the complaint); Munger v. Deutsche Bank, 2011 WL
2930907 at 9 (N.D. Ohio, July 18, 2011).
In the
absence of an actionable claim, this action is hereby
DISMISSED. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). An
appeal of the judgment rendered herein would not be taken in
good faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,
445-446 (1962). Therefore, the Plaintiff is
NOT certified ...