United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
H. MAYS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
the Court is Defendant City of Memphis's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff Theyer Ann Turner's complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and (b)(7). (ECF
Nos. 18, 18-16.) Plaintiff responded on October 6, 2017. (ECF
No. 32.) Defendant replied on October 26, 2017. (ECF No. 37.)
following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
October 15, 2015, Turner filed a Charge of Discrimination
(the “EEOC Charge”) with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”). (EEOC
Charge, ECF No. 1-2.) The EEOC Charge alleged that Defendant
had engaged in discrimination based on race, disability, and
FMLA rights. (Id.) It also alleged that Defendant
had retaliated by discharging Turner. (Id.) The EEOC
sent Turner a Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter, dated
March 30, 2017. (ECF No. 1-3.)
28, 2017, Turner brought this action against Defendant
raising claims of discrimination based on race, disability,
FMLA rights, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., as amended by
the ADA Amendment Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat.
August 15, 2017, Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF
brings suit under the ADA and Title VII. The Court has
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1331.
Federal courts do not have jurisdiction over claims brought
under the ADA or Title VII “‘unless the claimant
explicitly files the claim in an EEOC charge or the claim can
reasonably be expected to grow out of the EEOC
charge.'” Jones v. Sumser Retirement
Village, 209 F.3d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Abeita v. Transamerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246,
254 (6th Cir. 1998)). Turner filed her EEOC Charge on October
15, 2015. (EEOC Charge, ECF No. 1-2.) Her EEOC Charge alleges
discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII,
discrimination based on disability in violation of the ADA,
and retaliation. (Id.)
alleged discrimination occurred more than 180 days before the
plaintiff files an EEOC charge, claims based on that
discrimination are barred. See Carson v. Sim, 778
F.Supp.2d 85, 95 (D.D.C. 2011) (ADA claims); Alexander v.
Local 496, Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 177
F.3d 394, 407 (6th Cir. 1999) (Title VII claims).
“However, if the alleged unlawful practice occurs in a
‘deferral state' . . . which has enacted its own
laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, the plaintiff
must file suit within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory
act.” Alexander, 177 F.3d at 407l; see
also Carson, 778 F.Supp.2d at 95 (applying that
limitations period to ADA claims). Tennessee is a deferral
state. Howlett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 49 F.3d 189,
197 (6th Cir. 1995). “The three-hundred-day period
begins to run from the date of ‘the alleged unlawful
employment practice.'” Broadway v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 499 F.Supp.2d 992, 999 (M.D. Tenn.
2007) (internal citation omitted).
filed her EEOC Charge 290 days after the alleged unlawful
termination. Her EEOC Charge was timely. The Court has
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1331.
Standard of Review
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint that “fail[s]
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A
Rule 12(b)(6) motion permits the “defendant to test
whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to
legal relief even if everything alleged in the complaint is
true.” Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th
Cir. 1993) (citing Nishiyama v. Dickson Cnty., 814
F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1987)). A motion to dismiss is
designed to test whether the plaintiff has pled a cognizable
claim and allows the court to dismiss meritless cases that
would waste judicial resources and result in unnecessary
discovery. See Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops,
Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988).
evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the Court must determine whether the complaint alleges
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). If a court decides, in light of its
judicial experience and common sense, that the claim is not
plausible, the case may be dismissed at the pleading stage.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
[a] speculative level.” Ass'n of Cleveland Fire
Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A
claim is plausible on its face if “the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint need not
contain detailed factual allegations. However, a
plaintiff's “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. When deciding
a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court may look to
“matters of public record, orders, items appearing in
the record of the case and exhibits attached to the
complaint” for guidance. Barany-Snyder v.
Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir.
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join ...