United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
DEQUAN E. CROWELL, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
A. TRAUGER, U.S. District Judge
before the court are the Petitioner's pro se
Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 To Vacate, Set Aside, Or
Correct Sentence (Docket No. 1); a Notice Of Intent To Rely
On Pro Se Motion (Docket No. 14), filed by counsel for the
Petitioner; and the Government's Response (Docket No.
20). For the reasons set forth herein, the Petitioner's
Motion To Vacate (Docket No. 1) is DENIED, and this action is
Petitioner pled guilty on July 11, 2011, before now-retired
Judge William J. Haynes, Jr., to unlawful possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924. (Docket Nos. 23, 30 in No.
3:11cr00001). Through the Plea Agreement, the Petitioner
acknowledged that he qualified for a 15-year mandatory
minimum statutory sentence as an Armed Career Criminal, and
that he had the following prior Tennessee convictions: two
counts of aggravated assault in 2008; aggravated assault in
2004; and evading arrest in a motor vehicle in 2005. (Docket
No. 30, at 7, 11, in No. 3:11cr00001). The parties estimated
the Petitioner's guideline range to be 188 to 235 months
of imprisonment, and agreed to a sentence of 180 months.
(Id., at 13).
subsequent sentencing hearing, on September 19, 2011, Judge
Haynes imposed the 180-month agreed sentence. (Docket Nos.
29, 31, 32 in No. 3:11cr00001). The record reveals that no
appeal was taken.
28 U.S.C. § 2255
Petitioner has brought this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. Section 2255 provides a statutory mechanism for
challenging the imposition of a federal sentence:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established
by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). In order to obtain relief under
Section 2255, a petitioner “‘must demonstrate the
existence of an error of constitutional magnitude which had a
substantial and injurious effect or influence on the guilty
plea or the jury's verdict.'” Humphress v.
United States, 398 F.3d 855, 858 (6th Cir. 2005)(quoting
Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 736 (6th
factual dispute arises in a § 2255 proceeding, the court
is to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the dispute.
Ray v. United States, 721 F.3d 758, 761 (6th Cir.
2013). An evidentiary hearing is not required, however, if
the record conclusively shows that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); Ray,
721 F.3d at 761; Arredondo v. United States, 178
F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 1999). A hearing is also
unnecessary “if the petitioner's allegations
‘cannot be accepted as true because they are
contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or
conclusions rather than statements of fact.'”
reviewed the pleadings, briefs, and records filed in the
Petitioner's underlying criminal case, as well as the
filings in this case, the court finds it unnecessary to hold
an evidentiary hearing because the records conclusively
establish that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on
the issues raised.