Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, Nashville
Assigned on Briefs October 18, 2017
from the Criminal Court for Davidson County Nos. B-317 &
2007-D-3344 Cheryl A. Blackburn, Judge
Petitioner, Jessie D. McDonald, appeals from the Davidson
County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition
for a writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that
the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing his
petition as having been untimely filed and failing to state a
cognizable claim. Following our review, we affirm the
judgment of the coram nobis court.
R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal
D. McDonald, Nashville, Tennessee, pro se.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter;
Alexander C. Vey, Assistant Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk,
District Attorney General; and Megan McNabb King, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of
Kelly Thomas, Jr., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in
which Robert H. Montgomery, Jr., and Timothy L. Easter, JJ.,
KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE
False Pretenses Conviction
a 1974 jury trial, the Petitioner was convicted of the
offense of obtaining property by false pretenses in violation
of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-1901, now section
39-3-901 (case number B-317). For his crime, he was sentenced
to three years' incarceration. Upon direct appeal, this
court reversed the conviction. However, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee reversed our decision and reinstated the judgment.
See State v. McDonald, 534 S.W.2d 650 (Tenn. 1976),
reh'g denied (Mar. 15, 1976). The United States
Supreme Court later denied review. McDonald v.
Tennessee, 425 U.S. 955, reh'g denied, 425
U.S. 1000 (1976).
Petitioner, in the late 1980s, filed a pro se pleading in the
trial court styled "motion to set aside
conviction." See Jessie D. McDonald v. State,
No. 88-285-III, 1989 WL 22697, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar.
17, 1989), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 5, 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 845 (Oct. 2, 1989). The trial
court denied the motion on the basis of lack of jurisdiction
to grant the relief sought, and this court affirmed.
Id. at *2.
1989 opinion of this court, we noted then that the Petitioner
was a prolific litigant who had filed numerous actions
challenging the validity of his 1974 conviction. We made the
In the dozen or so years since the Tennessee Supreme
Court's opinion was released and [the Petitioner's]
conviction was reinstated, he has maintained a steady barrage
of pro se motions and petitions attacking the [s]upreme
[c]ourt's judgment. These have included petitions for
post-conviction relief, habeas corpus relief, and coram nobis
relief, as well as numerous motions to set aside the original
judgment under both the civil and criminal rules. The
complaint is always the same: that under the due process
clause, the [Petitioner] is entitled to have the 1974
judgment of conviction vacated based on this court's ...