Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Rushing v. Shelby County School System

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division

February 8, 2018

TAMMY RUSHING, Plaintiff,
v.
SHELBY COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM and DR. ANGELA BROWN, Defendants.

          ORDER

          SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Before the Court is Defendant Shelby County School System (“SCSS”)[1] and Defendant Dr. Angela Brown's (collectively, “Defendants”) Partial Motion to Dismiss, filed on September 21, 2017. (ECF No. 60.) Plaintiff responded on November 2, 2017. (ECF No. 64.)

         For the following reasons, the Partial Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

         I. BACKGROUND

         This Order includes an abbreviated background addressing events since the Court's August 7, 2017 Order. (ECF No. 55.) Events before August 7, 2017, are addressed in the August 7, 2017 Order.

         On August 7, 2017, the Court entered an Order addressing several pending motions, including Plaintiff's June 9, 2017 Motion to Consolidate. (Id.) The Order granted Plaintiff's request to consolidate Case No. 16-02662 and Case No. 17-02331 as one action under Case No. 16-02661. (Id. at 351-52.)[2] The Court ordered Plaintiff “to file, within 7 days of the entry of this order, a Unified Complaint combining the allegations and causes of action” in the two cases. (Id. at 352.) The Order provided that Plaintiff “may not add allegations beyond those in the two complaints.” (Id.)

         On August 31, 2017, Plaintiff filed her Unified Complaint. (ECF No. 59.) On September 21, 2017, Defendants filed the Partial Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 60.) Plaintiff responded on November 2, 2017. (ECF No. 64.)

         II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether the complaint alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The plausibility standard is met “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although the complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

         The Court is required to “accept all of plaintiff's factual allegations as true and determine whether any set of facts consistent with the allegations would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” G.M. Eng'rs & Assoc., Inc. v. West Bloomfield Twp., 922 F.2d 328, 330 (6th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). However, the Court need not accept as true legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot be plausibly drawn from the facts, as alleged. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (noting that in reviewing a motion to dismiss, the district court “must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, ” but that the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). Rule 12(b)(6) “allows the Court to dismiss, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, meritless cases which would otherwise waste judicial resources and result in unnecessary discovery.” Glass-man, Edwards, Wade & Wyatt, P.C. v. Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP, 601 F.Supp.2d 991, 997 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 10, 2009).

         III. ANALYSIS

         Defendants move to strike allegations that they argue Plaintiff added to her Unified Complaint in violation of the Court's Order. Defendants also move to dismiss several of the claims in Plaintiff's Unified Complaint.

         A. Additional Allegations in Unified Complaint

         Defendants contend that Plaintiff violated the Court's August 7, 2017 Order when she “alleged new facts” in paragraph 396 of the Unified Complaint. (Id. at 473.) Plaintiff contends that the new facts in that paragraph are a ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.