United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Chattanooga
JACK T. JONES, Petitioner,
DOUG COOK, Respondent.
S. MATTICE, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Now before the Court is Respondent's
motion to dismiss the petition as time-barred [Doc. 8].
Petitioner has filed a response in opposition to the motion
to dismiss [Doc. 11]. For the following reasons, the motion
to dismiss [Doc. 8] will be GRANTED and this
action will be DISMISSED.
April 18, 2007, Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of
aggravated sexual battery in the Criminal Court of Sumner
County, Tennessee. State v. Jones, No.
M2007-01494-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4853156, at *1 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Nov. 10, 2008); perm. app. denied Tenn. May 11,
2009; [Doc. 10-1 p. 21]. Petitioner was ordered to serve nine
years on each count, with the sentences for three of the four
counts to be served consecutively, resulting in a
twenty-seven year effective sentence. Id.
2, 2007, Petitioner filed an appeal of his conviction in
which he asserted that the trial court erred in requiring him
to serve his sentences consecutively and in giving him more
than the maximum sentence. State v. Jones, No.
M2007-01494-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4853156 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov.
10, 2008); perm. app. denied Tenn. May 11, 2009;
[Doc. 10-1 p. 26-28]. On November 10, 2008, the Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) remanded the
case for the trial court to modify Petitioner's total
effective sentence to twenty-four years, but otherwise
affirmed the trial court's judgments. Id. at
*8-9. On August 3, 2009, the Criminal Court for Sumner County
entered amended judgments in accordance with the TCCA's
finding [Doc. 12-1].
March 21, 2014, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Reopen
Post-Conviction Petition” in Sumner County Criminal
Court, which was treated as a motion for post-conviction
relief as Petitioner had not previously sought
post-conviction relief [Doc. 10-10 p. 3-20, 27]. The
post-conviction court denied the petition as time-barred,
finding that no due process issues tolled the statute of
limitations and that the Tennessee Criminal Court of Appeals
had previously determined the issue raised therein
[Id. at 27-28]. The Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed this denial on the same grounds. Jones
v. State, No. M2014-00863-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 4458911
(Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 10, 2014), perm. app. denied
Dec. 18, 2014.
filed the instant §2254 petition on January 15, 2015
[Doc. 1 p. 15].
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2241, et seq.,
provides a one-year statute of limitations for the filing of
an application for a federal writ of habeas corpus. The
statute provides, in relevant part:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application
for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State Court. The limitation period shall
run from the latest of--
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review . . . . [or]
* * *
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review . . .
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). However, the time “during
which a properly filed application for State post-conviction
or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any
period of limitation. . . .” 28 U.S.C. §
criminal defendant receives a new sentence, that judgment
permits him to file a new application to attack the sentence
and/or the conviction. King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154,
158 (6th Cir. 2015 (quoting Magwood v. Patterson,
561 U.S. 320, 338 (2010)). Thus, the statute of limitations
clock begins to run anew when the amended judgment becomes
final. Id. at 157.
forth above, on August 3, 2009, the Criminal Court for Sumner
County entered amended judgments regarding Petitioner's
sentence [Doc. 12-1]. Nothing in the record suggests that
Petitioner appealed or otherwise filed any post-judgment
motions regarding these amended judgments. As such, the
amended judgments became final on September 2, 2009, thirty
days after their entry. State v. Peele, 58 S.W.3d
701, 704 (Tenn. 2001) (holding that “[a] trial
court's judgment ...