United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
H. MAYS, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation (the “Report”), dated January 31,
2018. (ECF No. 7.) The Report recommends sua sponte
dismissal of Plaintiff Anthony Brown's complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1915. (Id. at 15.) Brown has not
filed an objection, and the deadline to do so has passed. For
the following reasons, the Report is ADOPTED, and Brown's
complaint is DISMISSED.
December 22, 2017, Brown filed a pro se complaint
against Defendant Lee V. Coffee, Judge Criminal Court Shelby
County, “for violation of Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.” (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Brown alleges that
he has not been able to obtain his criminal records from the
clerk's office since he was released from prison.
(Id. ¶ IV.) According to Brown, the clerks tell
him to obtain his criminal records from Judge Coffee instead
of the clerk's office. (Id.) He alleges that
Judge Coffee sealed his criminal records and the county
clerks cannot retrieve them. (Id.) Brown alleges
that this is a violation of his “constitutional
rights” and that he is “appealing this case into
federal court.” (Id.) For relief, Brown seeks
“to know why Judge  Coffee has the authority to hold
public records in his office and deny [him] the right to
[his] records.” (Id. ¶ V.) He also asks
for a “federal investigation done on the city
clerk's office for allowing Judge  Coffee to get away
with this constitutional rights violation.”
(Id.) Brown alleges that he has been trying to
obtain his records for three years. (Id.)
January 31, 2018, United States Magistrate Judge Diane K.
Vescovo entered the Report. (ECF No. 7.) It recommends that
the Court sua sponte dismiss Brown's complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for failure to state a claim.
(Id. at 15.) The Report explains that:
To the extent that Brown states any viable claim against
Judge Coffee, the claim is time-barred. The statute of
limitations for a § 1983 action is the “state
statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions
under the law of the state in which the § 1983 claim
arises.” Eidson v. Tenn. Dep't of
Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir.
2007). The Tennessee statute of limitations for personal
injury actions and actions brought under federal civil rights
statutes is one year. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a);
see also Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794
(6th Cir. 2005)(citations omitted)(“Because 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations,
the Court must look to state law to determine the appropriate
limitations period. Tennessee provides a one-year limitations
period for civil rights actions under § 1983.”).
While state law governs the duration of the limitation
period, federal law governs when the limitation period begins
to run. Roberson, 399 F.3d at 794 (citing Sharpe
v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 266 (6th Cir. 2003));
Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272-73 (6th Cir.
1984)). Under federal law, “[t]he statute of
limitations commences to run when the plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his
action.” Sevier, 742 F.2d at 273 (citations
In the present case, Brown alleges that Judge Coffee violated
his constitutional rights by sealing his records and impeding
Brown's access to them; Brown does not allege any other
constitutional violations. (Compl. ¶ IV, V, ECF No. 1.)
Brown further alleges that he has been trying to obtain his
records for three years. (Id. ¶ V.) Because
Brown knew of his injury more than one year before filing
suit, his complaint is time-barred and therefore fails to
state a claim.
(Id. at 18-19.)
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on the
federal judiciary by permitting the assignment of
district-court duties to magistrate judges. See United
States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001)
(citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869-70
(1989)); see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 F. App'x
308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003). For dispositive matters,
“[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part
of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been
properly objected to.” See Fed.R.Civ.P.
72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After reviewing the
evidence, the court is free to accept, reject, or modify the
magistrate judge's proposed findings or recommendations.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court is not
required to review -- under a de novo or any other standard
-- those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no
objection is made. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150
(1985). The district court should adopt the magistrate
judge's findings and rulings to which no specific
objection is filed. Id. at 151.
has not objected to the Report. Therefore, the Report should
be adopted. See Arn, 474 U.S. at 150-51.
foregoing reasons, the Report is ADOPTED, and Brown's
complaint is DISMISSED.
 Unless otherwise noted, all record
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