United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
W. PHILLIPS, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Wesley Cook pled guilty to failing to register as a sex
offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act (“SORNA”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2250(a). The United States Probation Office has prepared and
disclosed a revised Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”) [Doc. 22]. The defendant has filed
objections to four of the proposed special conditions of
supervised release in paragraph 88 of the revised PSR [Docs.
20, 24]. The government has responded by concurring in the
Probation Officer's recommendation of the proposed
special conditions [Doc. 26]. The Probation Office has also
responded to the objections and declined to remove the
proposed special conditions [Doc. 27].
2011, the defendant was convicted of Rape in the Court of
Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County, Ohio, a Tier III offense
[PSR ¶ 47]. This offense involved three child victims,
ages 5, 5 and 8, and included physical sexual contact
[Id.]. It is noteworthy that the description of
these crimes indicates that defendant “committed the
offenses by holding the victims down and locking doors”
[Id.]. Following this conviction, the defendant was
required to register as a sex offender under SORNA [PSR
three-year term of incarceration, the defendant was
supervised by the State of Tennessee [PSR ¶
In July 2016, the Tennessee Department of Corrections
reported to the State of Ohio that the defendant had violated
the terms of his parole, including testing positive for
marijuana, possession of marijuana, having pornography on his
phone, and failing to attend sex offender treatment [PSR
¶¶ 5, 47]. In August 2016, the defendant was
ordered to return to Cleveland, Ohio for a parole hearing
during which the Ohio Parole Board ordered the defendant to
remain in Ohio for the duration of his parole, that is, until
2019 [PSR ¶ 5]. The defendant admittedly did not do so
and returned to Tennessee [Id. at ¶ 6]. The
defendant did not notify law enforcement or update his sex
offender registration status from August 2016 until his
arrest on October 20, 2016 [Id. at ¶¶ 6,
9]. The defendant was indicted in the instant case in
February 2017 [Doc. 1].
defendant's objections pertain to the recommended
imposition of four special sex-offender supervision
conditions taken from this Court's Standing Order 15-06.
It is worth noting that defendant has not objected to
all of the proposed special sex-offender supervision
conditions. See, e.g., PSR paragraphs 88(b) - (f),
conditions of supervised release must be “reasonably
related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D).” 18 U.S.C. §
3583(d)(1). They must also impose “no greater
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the
purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and
(a)(2)(D), ” and be “consistent with any
pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2), (d)(3). The
Sixth Circuit set forth the following factors for
consideration in imposing special conditions of supervised
A sentencing court may impose a non-mandatory condition of
supervised release only if it meets three requirements.
First, the condition must be “reasonably related
to” several sentencing factors. These factors are
“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant” and
“the need for the sentence imposed . . . to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; . . . to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant; and . . . to
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner.” Second, the condition must
“involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary for” several sentencing purposes.
These purposes are “to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; . . . to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant; and . . . to provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care
or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner.” Third, the condition must be “consistent
with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” Because they are written in the
conjunctive, a condition must satisfy all three requirements.
However, a condition need not satisfy every single factor and
purpose within each of the first two requirements.
United States v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526, 529 (6th Cir.
2006) (citations omitted).
Carter, the defendant pled guilty in 2001 to being a
felon in possession of a firearm. In 2005, the district court
added a supervised release condition pertaining to sex
offenders. Carter's criminal history included 1988
convictions for rape and assault with intent to commit rape,
along with a 2004 stalking conviction. The Sixth Circuit
concluded that the 1988 convictions were too remote in time
to justify the 2005 imposition of a sex-offender-treatment
condition. Id. at 532. Carter's case was
remanded for the district court to determine whether the 2004
stalking offense was sufficiently sexual in nature to justify
imposition of the special condition. Id. at 533.
did not “decide precisely how much time must elapse
before a sex offense becomes too remote in time to be
reasonably related to a sex-offender condition.”
Id. at 532. Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit has
affirmed the imposition of sex-offender conditions based on
multiple sex offenses occurring as recently as 12 years
prior. See United States v. Brogdon, 503 F.3d 555,
565 (6th Cir. 2007). In the 2006 case of United States v.
Perkins, 207 F. App'x 559, the Sixth Circuit upheld
a sex-offender-treatment condition in light of a 1995 sex
offense conviction, a 1994 assault conviction, and older
assault charges. Id. at 562.
Sex Offender Mental Health Treatment
first objection is to paragraph 88(a) which recommends the
imposition of ...