Session February 20, 2018 
from the Circuit Court for Shelby County No. CT-000947-16
Rhynette N. Hurd, Judge.
state senator convicted of bribery appeals the trial
court's denial of the restoration of his voting rights
based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-204.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.
R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit
Mothershead, David W. Garrison, and Scott P. Tift, Nashville,
Tennessee, for the appellant, Roscoe Dixon.
Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter;
Andreé S. Blumstein, Solicitor General; Sarah K.
Campbell, Special Assistant to the Solicitor General and the
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee -
Steven Stafford, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the
court, in which Arnold B. Goldin, and Brandon O. Gibson, JJ.,
STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE.
2005, Petitioner/Appellant Roscoe Dixon
("Petitioner") was investigated and prosecuted in
federal court as part of the Tennessee Waltz corruption
sting. On June 8, 2006, the jury returned a
verdict finding Petitioner guilty of several crimes: (1) four
counts of interference with commerce by threat; and (2) one
count of bribery involving federal programs. An order on
judgment and sentence was entered on October 13, 2006;
Petitioner was sentenced to a total of sixty-three
months' incarceration and three years of supervised
March 7, 2016, following the completion of his incarceration
and probation, Petitioner filed a petition to restore his
citizenship and voting rights under Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-29-202. Although the State of Tennessee ("the
State") opposed the petition, the trial court entered an
order on November 21, 2016, granting Petitioner restoration
of his citizenship rights, other than his right to hold
public office or possess firearms.
December 7, 2016, the State filed a motion to alter or amend
the trial court judgment, arguing that Petitioner's
voting rights could not be restored due to the operation of
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-204(3), which provides
that for certain types of crimes, voting rights may not be
restored. Petitioner thereafter responded in opposition.
Petitioner did not deny that he had been convicted of a crime
specified by section 40-29-204(3). Petitioner argued,
however, that the statute could not apply because his
conviction occurred prior to July 1, 2006, the effective date
of the statute and the date the statute specified for its
terms to apply. Instead, Petitioner asserted that his
conviction occurred on June 8, 2006, the day the jury verdict
was returned. The State argued, however, that
Petitioner's conviction occurred on the date the judgment
was entered, well after the effective date of the statute.
The trial court ruled that section 40-29-204(3) was
applicable to Petitioner's conviction and that he was
therefore forever ineligible to vote. The trial court
therefore entered an amended order granting Petitioner's
petition for restoration of civil rights, excluding the right
to vote, the right to possess firearms, and the right to hold
public office. From this order, Petitioner now appeals.
Presented Petitioner raises three issues in this appeal,
which are taken from his brief and slightly restated:
1. Whether Petitioner was convicted of his offense before or
after the effective date of section 40-29-204(3).
2. Whether the ex post facto clause of the Tennessee
Constitution prohibits application of section 40-29-204(3) to
Petitioner, where Petitioner's offense was committed
prior to the enactment of section 40-29-204(3).
3. Whether Petitioner's right to vote is permanently
forfeited under section 40-29-204(3)?
appeal involves the interpretation of various statutes. As
such, our review is de novo with no presumption of
correctness. McFarland v. Pemberton, 530 S.W.3d 76,
91 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting Martin v. Powers, 505
S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tenn. 2016)). As explained by our supreme
When determining the meaning of statutes, our primary goal
"is to carry out legislative intent without broadening
or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope."
Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tenn. 2013)
(quoting Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889,
895 (Tenn. 2011)). We presume that every word in a statute
[or rule] has meaning and purpose and that each word's
meaning should be given full effect as long as doing so does
not frustrate the [drafter's] obvious intention.
Id. Words "'must be given their natural and
ordinary meaning in the context in which they appear and in
light of the statute's general purpose.'"
Id. (quoting Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360
S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012)). When a statute's ...