JILL ST. JOHN-PARKER
VIRGIL DUANE PARKER
Assigned on Briefs March 1, 2018
from the Circuit Court for Bradley County No. V-12-473
Lawrence Howard Puckett, Judge
prior appeal, this Court remanded to the trial court for
reconsideration of its marital property division. The trial
court affirmed its previous award and awarded an additional
sum to former wife as her equitable portion of the
parties' marital property. The trial court, however,
declined to calculate post-judgment interest on the
additional award as of the effective date of the divorce,
pursuant to this Court's holding in Watson v.
Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). On appeal,
former wife argues that Watson did not deprive the
trial court of discretion to calculate post-judgment interest
as of the earlier date. We affirm.
R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit
Court Affirmed and Remanded
Randall D. Larramore, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the
appellant, Jill St. John-Parker.
Capparella, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Virgil
Steven Stafford, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the
court, in which Frank G. Clement, P.J., M.S., and John W.
McClarty, J., joined.
STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE.
facts in this divorce case are undisputed for purposes of
this appeal. Relative to their divorce, Plaintiff/Appellant
Jill St. John-Parker ("Appellant") was awarded a
lump sum payment of $508, 706.98 in marital property to be
paid by Defendant/Appellee Virgil Duane Parker
("Appellee"). Appellee appealed the trial
court's judgment. See John-Parker v. Parker, No.
E2014-01338-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 2936834, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
May 17, 2016) [hereinafter, Parker I]. This Court,
inter alia, vacated the trial court's judgment regarding
the division of marital property, and remanded "to give
the trial court an opportunity to make a proper equitable
determination" of certain property that we determined
constituted marital property. Id. at *9.
remand, the trial court affirmed the prior judgment in favor
of Appellant in the amount of $508, 706.98, awarded an
additional amount for attorney's fees, and awarded
Appellant an additional $323, 175.60, as her equitable
portion of the marital property. In its oral ruling, the
trial court noted that the additional award would be
"retroactively effective as of the date of the divorce,
" but the order did not contain such language. On
November 22, 2016, Appellant filed a motion to alter or amend
the trial court's order to explicitly state that the new
judgment would be effective retroactively to the date of the
divorce and that post-judgment interest would be calculated
as of the date of the original judgment. The trial court
denied the motion on the basis that it was not permitted to
calculate post-judgment interest retroactive to the effective
date of the divorce under Watson v. Watson, 309
S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). The trial court noted,
however, that should Watson not control, it would
have ordered that post-judgment interest on the additional
$323, 175.60 judgment began to accrue as of October 22, 2013,
when the divorce was effective. From this order, Appellant
case presents a single issue: whether the trial court was
permitted to award post-judgment interest on the $323, 175.60
judgment as of the effective date of the divorce in this
particular case. The award of post-judgment interest is
mandated by statute. See Vooys v. Turner, 49 S.W.3d
318, 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) ("[T]he allowance of
interest is based upon statute[.]"). Pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-14-122, "[i]nterest
shall be computed on every judgment from the day on which the
jury or the court, sitting without a jury, returned the
verdict without regard to a motion for a new trial." The
language of section 47-14-122 is mandatory. Clark v.
Shoaf, 302 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Ali v. Fisher, 145 S.W.3d 557, 565 (Tenn. 2004)).
According to this Court,
A party's right to postjudgment interest is based on that
party's entitlement to use the proceeds of the judgment
after the award. . . . "[T]he purpose of postjudgment
interest is to compensate the successful plaintiff for being
deprived of compensation for the loss from the time between