United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A. VARLAN CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
criminal case is before the Court on the defendant's
pro se Motion to Amend and Consolidate Sentences
with Pretrial Credits [Doc. 129]. The defendant is currently
in the custody of the State of Tennessee, serving a
fifteen-year sentence for second-degree murder. The Scott
County Criminal Court imposed this sentence to run
concurrently with the defendant's previously imposed
300-month sentence in this case for being a felon in
possession of unregistered firearms [Id. at 4; Doc.
81]. After providing various details as to the timing of his
federal and state convictions, the defendant “asks this
[C]ourt to amend and consolidate [his] federal sentence to
also start and run concurrently with that of his state
sentence by ordering it to begin either on 3/9/07 or
3/17/07[, ] which would give him all pretrial credits and
time already served toward [his] federal sentence”
[Doc. 129 p. 2]. The defendant asserts that the state court
intended for this to be the case “but failed to order
him back into proper federal custody, as promised”
[Id.]. The government has responded in opposition to
the defendant's motion [Doc. 132].
carefully considering the matter, the Court finds that it
cannot provide the defendant the relief he seeks. First, to
the extent the defendant is asking the Court to modify his
sentence in this case, the Court notes that federal courts
“may modify a defendant's sentence only as provided
by statute.” United States v. Johnson, 564
F.3d 419, 421 (6th Cir. 2009); see also United States v.
Curry, 606 F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[O]nce
a court has imposed a sentence, it does not have the
authority to change or modify that sentence unless such
authority is expressly granted by statute.”);
United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 748 (6th
Cir. 2008) (noting the same); United States v. Ross,
245 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that district
courts lack inherent authority to modify a term of
imprisonment without express statutory authorization). Here,
the defendant points to no statutory authority for the
Court's ability to modify his federal sentence in the
manner he requests. The government denies that such authority
exists, and the Court has been unable to locate any through
its own research. Thus, the Court will deny the
defendant's request that the Court modify his sentence in
to the extent the defendant is asking the Court to order that
his time served in state custody count toward his federal
sentence as well, the Court lacks authority to grant such
relief. “[T]he power to grant credit for time served
lies solely with the Attorney General and the Bureau of
Prisons, ” not the federal courts. United States v.
Crozier, 259 F.3d 503, 520 (6th Cir. 2001). Moreover,
the Court observes that federal law expressly prohibits the
double-counting of time served toward state and federal terms
of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b); see also
United States v. Lytle, 565 Fed.Appx. 386, 392 (6th Cir.
2014) (“Time which has been credited towards service of
a state sentence may not be ‘double counted'
against a federal sentence.”).
to the extent the defendant is challenging the manner in
which the Bureau of Prisons will calculate his federal
sentence, such a claim could be brought only via a habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. United States v.
Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that a
challenge to the manner of execution of a sentence, rather
than the sentence's validity, is cognizable under §
2241); see also Woody v. Marberry, 178 Fed.Appx.
468, 471 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that a challenge to the
BOP's calculation of credit for time served in
pre-sentencing detention was properly brought under §
2241). But such a petition must generally be filed in the
federal district where the defendant is held, United
States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 449 (6th Cir.
2004), and the petitioner must also show that he has
exhausted his administrative remedies before seeking relief
under § 2241, Graham v. Snyder, 68 Fed.Appx.
589, 590-91 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, the defendant admits he is
currently housed at the Hardeman County Correctional
Facility, which lies within the Western District of
Tennessee. Further, the defendant gives no indication that he
has made any attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Thus, even if the defendant intended to seek relief under
§ 2241, this Court would lack authority to grant such
for the reasons discussed above, the defendant's Motion
to Amend and Consolidate Sentences with Pretrial Credits
[Doc. 129] is hereby DENIED.
 The government also argues that such a
request would in effect constitute a motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct the defendant's sentence under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. The government argues that such a motion
would be procedurally improper because (1) the defendant has
not sought leave from the Sixth Circuit to file a successive
§ 2255 motion, as required by § 2255(h), and (2)
the motion would be untimely under the one-year filing
deadline set forth in § 2255(f). The Court need not
reach these questions, however, because it finds that ...