Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, Knoxville
STEVEN O. HUGHES-MABRY
RANDY LEE, WARDEN and STATE OF TENNESSEE
Assigned on Briefs February 27, 2018
from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County No. S54, 919
William K. Rogers, Judge
Petitioner, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal
Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of
error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the coram
nobis court erred by summarily dismissing his petition as
having been untimely filed and for failing to state a
cognizable claim for relief. Following our review, we agree
with the coram nobis court that the Petitioner is attempting
to relitigate the denial of his pretrial suppression motion.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.
R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal
O. Hughes-Mabry, Mountain City, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; M.
Todd Ridley, Assistant Attorney General; and Barry P.
Staubus, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State
Kelly Thomas, Jr., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in
which James Curwood Witt, Jr., and Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.,
KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE
case arises from two undercover officers' conducting
surveillance at a gas station in Kingsport on October 30,
2007. Thereafter, the Petitioner was convicted of possession
of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or
deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone, introduction of
contraband into a penal institution, and driving on a
suspended license. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§
39-16-201, 39-17-417, 39-17-432 & 55-50-504. He was
sentenced to concurrent terms of fifteen years, three years,
and six months, respectively. A full recitation of the
underlying facts can be found in this court's opinion on
direct appeal. See State v. Steven O. Hughes-Mabry,
No. E2011-02255-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 4046466, at *1-3 (Tenn.
Crim. App. May 16, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn.
Oct. 16, 2013).
to trial, the Petitioner filed a motion to suppress "all
evidence obtained, arising from, and incident to the stop,
arrest and search conducted by agents of the Kingsport Police
Department and/or the Sullivan County Sheriff's
Department." Hughes-Mabry, 2013 WL 4046466, at
*1. As grounds for suppression, the Petitioner contended that
he "did not engage in a consensual encounter with law
enforcement officials, nor was there a reasonable basis or
probable cause for an investigatory stop or probable cause
for a seizure." The trial court denied the motion.
Petitioner raised this issue, among others, on direct appeal.
He argued that his suppression motion was improperly denied,
specifically that the evidence "was obtained without a
reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop and therefore
without probable cause for a search" in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. Hughes-Mabry, 2013 WL
4046466, at *4. He additionally framed the issue as follows:
"The trial court erred in denying the [Petitioner's]
motion to suppress because the officers['] actions were
not within a community caretaker function and there was not a
consensual conversation. The officers lacked a sufficient
basis for an investigatory stop of the [Petitioner]."
Id. This court affirmed, concluding,
In [State v.] Butler, we held that "an officer
may legitimately approach a vehicle parked in a public place
and make a request for identification of the driver."
795 S.W.2d [680, ] 685 [(Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)]. In this
case, the officers had actually seen the [Petitioner's]
driving the vehicle before walking up to him in a public
place and requesting identification. The [Petitioner]
consented to speak with Sgt. Crawford, and upon questioning,
he could not provide a valid driver's license. As relied
upon by the State in their argument, Tennessee Code Annotated
section 55-50-351(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every licensee shall have such licensee's license in
immediate possession at all times when operating a motor
vehicle and shall display it upon demand of any
officer or agent of the department or any police officer of
the state, county or municipality . . . . [A]ny other law
enforcement officer . . . has the right to demand the
exhibition of the license of any operator of a motor-driven
cycle as described ...