United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A. VARLAN CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is the defendant's pro se motion for a
sentence reduction [Doc. 44]. On October 7, 2015, the
defendant entered a guilty plea to one count of enticement of
a minor for sexual purposes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2422(b) [Docs. 17, 28]. Then, on March 15, 2016, the Court
sentenced the defendant to a term of 120 months'
imprisonment, followed by ten years of supervised release
[Doc. 39]. This represented the mandatory minimum sentence to
which the Court could have sentenced the defendant. §
2422(b). Indeed, in their sentencing memoranda, both parties
recognized that by statute the Court could impose a sentence
of no less than 120 months' imprisonment [Docs. 35-36].
defendant now asks the Court to reduce his sentence to
“the 20 month range” [Doc. 44 p. 7]. The
defendant asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides
the Court with authority to grant this relief and that such a
sentence would be sufficient, but not greater than necessary
to serve the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a). The defendant further notes that other courts have
granted departures below 120 months in similar or more
egregious cases. Finally, the defendant argues that he is
entitled to resentencing in light of constitutional equal
protection and due process concerns, given that other
defendants convicted of crimes against children have received
carefully considering the matter, the Court finds that it
cannot provide the defendant the relief he seeks. Federal
district courts “may modify a defendant's sentence
only as provided by statute.” United States v.
Johnson, 564 F.3d 419, 421 (6th Cir. 2009); see also
United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir.
2010) (“[O]nce a court has imposed a sentence, it does
not have the authority to change or modify that sentence
unless such authority is expressly granted by
statute.”); United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d
743, 748 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting the same); United States
v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that
district courts lack inherent authority to modify a term of
imprisonment without express statutory authorization from
the sole source of authority to which the defendant cites is
§ 3582(c)(2), along with the general sentencing
considerations of § 3553(a). But § 3582(c)(2) only
permits the resentencing of “a defendant who has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission.” The defendant has not alleged that any
amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines after his sentencing
hearing has lowered the advisory guideline range for a §
2422(b) violation. Indeed, the relevant Guideline provision,
section 2G1.3(a)(3), has not been amended since the
defendant's sentencing hearing. Moreover, nothing in §
3553 authorizes the Court to modify a sentence that it has
even assuming the Court had authority to resentence the
defendant, he is still subject to a 120-month mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment under § 2422(b). Thus, the
Court could not impose a sentence any lower than that which
the defendant originally received. See United States v.
Marshall, 870 F.Supp.2d 489, 492 (N.D. Ohio 2012)
(noting that a district court ordinarily “is not
authorized to sentence a defendant below the statutory
mandatory minimum, ” even in light of the §
3553(a) considerations). As such, the defendant's motion for
a sentence reduction [Doc. 44] is hereby
 The defendant relies on two cases in
particular: United States v. Weiner, No. 1:17-cr-307
(S.D.N.Y.), and United States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398
(4th Cir. 2017). Neither of these cases supports the
defendant's argument that the Court could resentence him
below his mandatory minimum. First, the defendant in
Weiner (former Congressman Anthony Weiner) was
convicted of the transfer of obscene material to a minor, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470 [No. 1:17-cr-307, Doc.
307]. That offense carries no mandatory minimum. § 1470.
Second, the defendant in Zuk was convicted of
possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). 874 F.3d at 400. That offense likewise
carries no mandatory minimum. § 2252A(b)(2). Thus, the
fact that those defendants received lower sentences than this
defendant is immaterial.
 The latest amendments to section
2G1.3, Amendments 732 and 737, became effective in 2009.
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G1.3
historical note (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2016). As noted
above, the defendant was sentenced on March 15, 2016 [Doc.
 The Court also finds the
defendant's conclusory allegations of a constitutional
violation to lack merit. The fact that the defendant received
a higher sentence under a statute containing a mandatory
minimum than defendants convicted under different statutes
does not raise any equal protection or due process concerns.
Indeed, the defendant has cited no authority to support this